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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTUION 
 
The Puzzle 
 
This thesis explores why the relationship between Japan and the Republic of 
Korea (ROK or South Korea) has been volatile in the post-Cold War period. For 
example, in late 1998, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and South Korean 
President Kim Dae Jung signed the Joint and Declaration and Action for a New 
Korea-Japan Partnership in the 21st Century. This meant that the ROK and Japan 
began to overcome their contentious relations and opened an epoch of cooperation. 
Yet, this cooperative relationship did not last long. Their cooperative relations 
terminated in April 2001, as the ROK recalled its ambassador - Choi Sang Yong - to 
Tokyo to protest against the Japanese government's approval of middle school 
textbooks which whitewashed Japan's wartime atrocities during the occupation period. 
This instance is just one typical case for how Japan-ROK relations have been 
volatile throughout the Cold War period, as well as the post-Cold War period. Figure 1 
schematically depicts their volatile relations during the post-Cold War period.1 As 
illustrated, although there have been periods of cooperation, their relations have 
frequently conflictive. The relationship between them has been damaged repeatedly by 
disputes and friction. As a result, for instance,2 joint ministerial meetings have 
                                            
1 Figure 1 is constructed as a result of what the previous studies denoted as periods of 
cooperation and of friction (e.g., Kristof 1998; Cha 2001; Choi 2004; Koo 2005; Moon et al 
2005; Lee 2006 Kim 2006; Rozman and Lee 2006).    
2 There various cases in which the two Asian countries postponed or cancelled scheduled 
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sometimes been delayed or cancelled. Japan-ROK summit talks have also been 
occasionally postponed or suspended. In 2005, a diplomatic war against Japan was 
proclaimed by South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun. Victor Cha (1997-a: 3) argues 
that “the normal state of relations between Japan and the ROK is characterized by 
friction.” In addition, it has been said among Japanese and Koreans that the phrase “so 
near, yet so far”3 best describes Japan-ROK relations.4
Friction 
Cooperation 
1996
2002-
2003 
1998 - 2000
2001
1994
2005 
Figure 1. Reality in Japan-ROK relations in the post-Cold War period  
 
This volatile relationship between Japan and South Korea poses a question for 
                                                                                                                             
meetings. For instance, South Korean president cancelled a meeting with Japanese lawmakers 
in February 10, 1996. Japanese and South Korean leaders began ‘shuttle diplomacy,’ in which 
leaders of the two countries paid mutual visits twice a year, in July 2004, but the exchanges 
did not continue. The ‘shuttle diplomacy’ was stopped a year later. The joint foreign affair 
ministerial meeting between Japan and the ROK was cancelled in late 2005.  
3 In Japan, Korea is characterized as “chikakute toi kuni” (a country that is both close and far) 
and Koreans depict Japan as “kapkpkodo mon nara” (a country that is both close and far). See 
Kim (2006).    
4 There is distinction between physical distance and psychological distance. For instance, 
Ferguson and Mansbach (2004: 69) collectively argue “Psychological distance is the degree of 
dissimilarity between cognitive frameworks or ways of looking at, assigning meaning to and 
coping with the world regardless of geographic distance.” 
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international relations (IR) theories. It is difficult for each of the three mainstream IR 
perspectives to adequately explain why there have been such variations in levels of 
cooperation and friction in Japan-ROK relations over time, as each anticipates either a 
pattern of cooperation or conflict. Realists assume that Japan and South Korea are 
likely to cooperate with each other because they jointly confront bellicose and 
provocative threats from Russia, China, and/or North Korea. Liberals envision a 
cooperative pattern because the two countries are economically interdependent and 
share democratic institutions and norms. By contrast, constructivists expect conflict 
because identities and norms have grown apart owing to the repeated emergence of 
historical antagonism related to selected issues. These identities and norms have 
conditioned their perception of competing interests, thereby producing a contentious 
and conflictive relationship.  
As seen above, accounting for why the Japanese-South Korean relationship 
has combined cooperation and conflict in unexpected ways is a challenging task for 
international relations theory and has become fashionable to explore the reasons for 
their relations. There have been a variety of studies seeking to account for the volatile 
relationship (e.g. Lee 1985; Hong 1985; Wakasuki 1992; Cha 1997-a; Kristof 1998; 
Hwang 2003; Koo 2005), yet, most of these studies have not successfully explained 
why their relations have been conflictive as well as cooperative. Probably, the most 
successful approach in accounting for the long-term variation of Japan-ROK relations 
is the quasi-alliance theory articulated by Cha (1997-a). The crux of his quasi-alliance 
theory is that the security commitment of the United States to its two allies is a key 
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causal determinant of the changes in Japan-ROK bilateral behavior in the Cold War 
period. However, is the idea of quasi-alliance still applicable to explaining the volatile 
Japan-ROK relations in post-Cold War era? This thesis argues that quasi-alliance 
theory is significantly less credible in the post-Cold War era because variations in 
Japan-ROK bilateral behavior have been independent of the changes in the level of the 
US security commitment to its allies. Furthermore, this thesis contends that although 
their volatile relations are not explained by a single IR paradigm, the variations of the 
Japan-ROK relations in the post-Cold War are accounted for if we selectively use and 
combine different IR theoretical perspectives. For the study of Japan-ROK relations in 
the post-Cold War, this leads us to favor a pluralist approach which is capable of 
analyzing material and ideational factors simultaneously through selectively 
integrating theoretical insights from the different IR research traditions.  
Having briefly described the puzzle and the pluralist approach for the post-
Cold war Japan-ROK relations, we will turn to the concept of a pluralist approach and 
pluralist accounts for post-Cold War Japan-ROK relations in detail in chapter 3.  
 
Importance of This Research 
The importance of this study is primarily threefold. First, this research is 
important because it offers adequate explanations for variations in Japan-ROK 
bilateral behavior. Instead of claiming that the pluralist theoretical explanations 
presented in this thesis are the only account for volatile Japan-ROK relations, this 
study seeks to sufficiently demonstrate we can adequately explain their volatile 
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relations if we selectively draw insights on three IR paradigms, given that each IR 
paradigm cannot account for the relations alone. 
Second, it contributes to the security study of East Asia. The cooperation 
between Japan and the ROK is critical for stability and peace on Northeast Asia and 
the Korean peninsula where the interest of the four superpowers intersect (e.g., Cha 
1997-a; Kim and Glosserman 2004). Perhaps whether Northeast Asia appears to be 
“ripe of rivalry” is to a large extent dependent upon the cooperation between them 
with the help of the United States. In addition, if these two democracies do not 
cooperate with each other, it is difficult to lead to the transformation of North Korea, 
or to establish a pacific collective security institution in the region. Accordingly, this 
study is valuable as it identifies how to improve their relations by analyzing what has 
caused the relations to be contentious and conflictive.  
Finally, it contributes to the study of international relations. There may be 
many cases that are important affairs but are treated as anomalies because each IR 
paradigm tends to focus on their own preselected variables and particular aspects of 
problems. Volatile Japan-ROK relations fall into this category. However, as 
Katzenstein and Okawara (2004) argue, it is important to make sense of empirical 
anomalies, which often appear to be fundamentally critical affairs and should be 
adequately explained by any feasible ways. To resolve this issue, this study suggests 
that one alternative to account for anomalous affairs is to combine insights from 
different IR perspectives. In addition, this study shows that it is not desirable to 
approach an anomalous problem with a single IR research context and ignore the 
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advantages of other perspectives’ explanations. In this regard, this study contributes to 
the development of IR. 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
The remaining parts of this thesis are organized as follows. Chapter 2 
conducts the literature survey on the previous studies of Japan-ROK relations. Chapter 
3 explores the theoretical insights of the three competing IR research traditions and 
their inadequacy for accounting for their relations and shows the pluralist accounts for 
their relations. Finally, Chapter 4 presents the conclusion of the study.  
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
Review on the Previous Studies 
 This section is devoted to illustrating how previous studies explained Japan-
ROK relations. The majority of the previous studies are single, case-oriented studies 
which aim at accounting for the conflictive side of the relationship between South 
Korea and Japan in the wake of a past colonial issue. These studies do not offer 
theoretical accounts either for the cooperative relations, or for the long-term variation 
of the Japan-ROK behavior. They are, in general, inclined toward explaining the effect 
of the historical animosity on their relations and conducted mostly by area specialists.  
There is another set of studies employing the essence of liberalism. They 
focus on explaining why a friction derived from historical and territorial issues has not 
escalated to an actual military conflict. Yet, they are still case studies and cannot 
account for the lasting volatility in Japan-ROK relations. Only a few of the studies 
have attempted to account for the long-term variation. These studies, however, prove 
to be inadequate. 
 
Case Study-Oriented Research 
Historical Animosity-Driven Lens: Many scholars of the study of Japan-
ROK relations (e.g., Lee 1985; Hong 1985; Wakasuki 1992; Kristof 1998) emphasize 
the important role of historical animosity between Japanese and Koreans in 
understanding the unpredictable relationship between the two countries. They argue 
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that psychological barriers stemming largely from Japan’s occupation in the Korean 
peninsula from 1910 to 1945 are the primary causes of friction.  
 According to the scholars of the historical animosity-driven perspective, 
during Korea’s colonial subjugation by Japan for thirty six years, the Japanese colonial 
government sought to assimilate Koreans and to reconstruct the Korean society as 
“little Japan.” As a part of this strategy, the imperial government banned Korean 
language and forced Koreans to employ Japanese surnames and worship the Shinto 
religion. It distorted Korean history, destroyed various legacies, and national treasures, 
some of which were transported to Japan.  
In addition, the colonial government executed labor-conscription programs 
and sent roughly the twenty percent of Korea’s rural population into mining and 
military-industrial manufacturing areas.5 Numerous ordinary Koreans were also 
drafted into the Japanese military. Moreover, thousands of Korean women served as 
sex slaves. Needlessly to say, Korean protests for national independence were 
suppressed and many of the activists and supporters for independence were often 
brutally tortured and killed.  
Certainly, Japanese colonial policies were not always ruthless and brutal. The 
colonial government produced some benefits for the development of South Korea, 
such as improvements to the Korean educational system, a governmental bureaucracy, 
and modernized industry and infrastructure. In addition, there was a period in which 
bureaucrat-origin governor-generals ruled Korea by performing an appeasement policy 
                                            
5 According to Cha(1997-a: 19), the Japanese government “abruptly transported nearly 20 
percent of the rural population to low-skill mining and factory jobs in northern Korea, 
Manchuria, Sakhalin, and Japan under subhuman working conditions.” 
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(Lee 1985). Yet, area specialists claim that, for Koreans, harsher periods tend to be 
remembered more vividly and persistently than those of moderate rule.  
 These collective memories6 have been the basis for Koreans’ bitterness 
toward the Japanese. Anti-Japanese sentiment has become a major part of Korean 
national identity and nationalism (e.g., Lee 1985; Cha 1997-a; Kristof 1998; Hwang 
2003). This historical antagonism has passed down generation to generation through 
mass media, folklore, and formal and informal history education. March 1st and 
August 15th have been national holidays to commemorate the March First 
Proclamation of Korean Independence from Japan and the Liberation from Japan, 
respectively, since the creation of the ROK. South Koreans collectively recall brutal 
Japanese militarism on these two days. In this context, this historical antagonism has 
been profoundly embedded in the South Korean society.  
Unlike the South Korean society, the brutal colonial past history has barely 
been recognized and has often been disregarded in Japanese society. Japanese in 
general do not know how brutally its imperial government ruled its colonies, including 
Korea, because the Japanese education system, which is controlled by the Ministry of 
Education compelling teachers to use approved textbooks, played a great role in 
playing down Japanese war aggression (McCargo 2004: 152). There is also a sense of 
superiority on the part of the Japanese, the formal colonizers. This sense of superiority 
was often vocalized by Japanese high ranking officials. For instance, statements of 
Wajima Eiji, director of Control Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, evidently reflected 
                                            
6 Understanding collective memory is important for this thesis. As Consuelo Cruz (2000) 
points out, collective memory is able to impel actors to define themselves intersubjectively. In 
state-centric analysis, it can serve as a key trait of national identity.  
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such a feeling. In 1949, he said: “The Japanese have always considered the Koreans to 
be an inferior race. A very elaborate study on the racial characteristics of Koreans had 
been prepared during the war and it had concluded that the mental and social 
capacities of the Koreans were of a very primitive nature.”7 There were also Japanese 
officials’ and politicians’ attempts to justify the colonization and ignore the need for 
apology for war victims.8 Area specialists thus contend that these Japanese superiority 
sentiments inherent in collective perceptions of Japan as a former colonizer of Korea 
were a basis for the Japanese general attitude toward Koreans (Cha 1997-a: 20).  
As a result, for scholars who focus on historical antagonism, material threats 
and the United States have not been critical variables for understanding Japan-ROK 
relations. Instead, they see psychological factors such as historical animosity or 
mistrust as critical variables in changing Japan-ROK relations and the lack of 
collective identity9 between Japan and South Korea preventing the two countries from 
creating mutual interests and cooperation (Moon et al. 2005). When issues related to 
deep-seated enmity break out, historical antagonism brings about friction. This 
antagonism also makes it difficult for the two countries to cooperate with each other 
even if mutual security cooperation between them is perceived (Hwang 2003: 95-96). 
                                            
7 Quoted in (Cheong 1991: 72). 
8 See Lee (1985) and Cha (1997-a) for more information.  
9 Of course, Koreans and Japanese have multiple identities. Yet, since there are a hierarchy of 
identities and a tendency that at any issue, one or a few identities outweighs the rest of 
identities (see Ferguson and Mansbach [2004]), the lack of collective identities in the study of 
the ROK-Japanese relations specifically means that in the wake of past colonial and territorial 
issues, Japanese and especially Koreans drop the shared identities derived, for instance, from 
globalization and Asian culture, and focus on the identities related to the colonial issues. See 
also Samuel Kim (2006) who argues that the rises of the past colonial and territorial issues 
inspire colonial/imperial recall among ordinary Koreans.  
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Their views are useful for explaining the cases that Japan-ROK relations were 
damaged by the rise of the historical animosity-related issues.  
Yet, although historical antagonism-focused scholars’ descriptive/narrative 
view is certainly credible to understand their relations, their view fails to answer why 
there have been both cooperative and contentious periods in their relations during the 
post-Cold War. They are not able to account for long-term variations in the two 
countries’ foreign policy outcomes (Cha 1997-a; Hwang 2003).   
Economic Interdependence-Driven Lens: Some scholars (Manosevitz 2003; 
Koo 2005) explored Japan-ROK relations by looking at the positive impact of 
economic interdependence on their relationship. Manosevitz (2003) argues that, rather 
than threats from North Korea, shared economic interests drawn from significant 
economic interdependence increased the desire for and the durability of the 
cooperation between the ROK and Japan in the post-Cold War period. He then claims 
that these interests have pushed the two states to reach “adolescence in their security 
relationship, meaning that even with some political issues remaining unresolved, 
interest in low-level security cooperation is solid, with room to grow” (Manosevitz 
2003: 802). Similarly, Koo (2005) contends that, since South Korea and Japan are 
economically interdependent, the Tokto (in Korean)/Takeshima (in Japanese) 
(hereafter Tokto) territorial disputes are apt to be contained, if not ended. He envisions 
that economic interdependence between Japan and South Korea are likely to prevent 
the collapse of the Japan-ROK governmental relations even when historical 
antagonism-related issues cause turbulence in their relations.  
 12  
 Despite their insights on the positive impact of economic interdependence on 
Japan-ROK relations, these authors’ accounts cannot avoid confronting the criticism 
that there have been cases in which diplomatic relations have deteriorated. For 
instance, when the Japanese Ministry of Education approved history textbooks which 
whitewashed Japanese military aggression, South Korea recalled its ambassador, froze 
private-sector exchanges, and postponed the cultural market opening in 2001. In 
addition, in 2005, there was the South Korean President Roh’s declaration10 on “a 
virtual diplomatic war on Japan.” 
It is a challenging assignment for the liberal perspective to account for 
emergence of these conflictive activities. It is not persuasive to argue that these 
conflictive activities are irrelevant as counter-evidence since there has been no actual 
military conflict between the ROK and Japan. Although economic interdependence is 
certainly an important variable for the study of their relations, it is not a single 
determinant of the behaviors of the ROK and Japan.    
 
Studies on the Long-Term Variations 
Quasi Alliance Theory: As already discussed, quasi-alliance theory is the 
most successful efforts to date for explaining the long-term variations of the bilateral 
relationship between South Korea and Japan. “A quasi alliance is one in which two 
states remain unallied but share a third party as a common ally” (Cha 1997-a: 3).  
Cha observed that Japan-ROK relations in the Cold War period were volatile 
                                            
10 Korea Times, March 24, 2005.  
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despite collectively being threatened by communist adversaries. He then realized that 
accounting for the volatile relations was a difficult task for the realist school of 
thought, according to which countries confronting common threats should be 
cooperative and friendly (Walt 1985; Cha 1997-a). Eventually, he argued that the 
anomalous relations were accounted for by transforming realist balance-of-threats 
theory. The transformation resulted in the creation of quasi-alliance theory, depicted in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
High Threats Low Threats 
Balance of Threat Æ cooperative (alliance 
formation likely) 
Balance of Threat Æ non-cooperative 
(alliance formation unlikely) 
High commitment 
(USA) 
Low commitment 
(USA) 
High commitment 
(USA) 
Low commitment 
(USA) 
Quasi Alliance Æ 
Non-cooperative 
 
Quasi Alliance Æ 
Cooperative 
(alignment likely) 
Quasi Alliance Æ 
Non-cooperative 
Quasi Alliance Æ 
Cooperative 
(alignment likely) 
Figure 2. Quasi-Alliance Theory  
 
According to Cha’s parsimonious theory, historical antagonism arising from 
Japan’s occupation of Korea from 1910 to 1945 prevented the ROK and Japan not 
only from establishing a consistent security relationship, but also from cooperating 
with each other, even though they confronted common threats. Instead, since it was 
imperative for the two countries to find a means to protect their security from the 
communist threats, they each decided to ally bilaterally with the United States, 
resulting in sharing the US as a common ally. In this context, the ROK and Japan 
could engage in conflict and did not need to cooperate with each other since their 
security was fully protected under the umbrella of American security. However, on 
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those occasions when the US reduced its defense commitment to the region, the fear of 
being abandoned by the superpower produced Korean-Japanese cooperation, not only 
because of increased threat but also because of their desire to reinvigorate the US 
security commitment. Accordingly, quasi-alliance theory explains the volatility of 
Japan-ROK relations in the Cold War period by looking at the variability of the US 
security commitment to each. Cha predicted that this quasi-alliance theory would 
continuously dictate their relations in the post-Cold War (Cha 1997-a: 207-210).  
Although it seems strange that Japan-ROK relations would be more 
cooperative and friendly if the United States stayed away from the region, this thesis 
acknowledges the importance of Cha’s theory to the study of their volatile relations. 
However, this study also contends that the idea of quasi-alliance is not sufficient for 
understanding volatile Japan-ROK relations in post-Cold War era, for two reasons. 
First, variations in Japan-ROK bilateral behavior have been independent of the 
changes in the level of the US security commitment to its allies. For example, when 
the North Korean nuclear crises posed significant threats for Japan and South Korea 
and the United States was committed to the management of these crises, quasi-alliance 
theory would predict the ROK and Japan do not need to cooperate with each other. 
Contrary to this expectation, Seoul and Tokyo did cooperate with other in the wake of 
the two nuclear crises. Regardless of the change in the US security commitment to 
them, South Korea sometimes worked with Japan through the trilateral cooperation 
system, but sometimes the ROK remained reluctant to cooperate with Japan, which 
will be analyzed shortly. Second, the United States has lost its leverage on 
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contemporary Japan-ROK relations to some degree. This is because external material 
threats have played a less important role in the relations than in earlier periods, so that 
post-Cold War Japan-ROK relations have moved into a new period in which their 
relationship is less likely than ever to be explained by the pure logic of material 
security. Consequently, their volatile relations in the post-Cold War are not explained 
by quasi-alliance theory.  
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Chapter 3. PLURALIST EXPLANATION  
 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it explores the theoretical 
insights of the three prevailing IR paradigms (realism, liberalism, and constructivism). 
Second, it demonstrates the theoretical approach of this thesis. Finally, it shows the 
explanations of pluralist approach for why Japan-ROK relations have been volatile in 
the post-Cold War period, as schematically depicted in Figure 1. Japan-ROK relations, 
which had entered a period of contention at the beginning part of the post-Cold War 
era, began to establish institutionalized exchanges and consultations in the wake of the 
first North Korean nuclear crisis. Their cooperative efforts soon faded in the eruption 
of the Tokto territorial dispute in 1996. Yet, their conflictive relations again turned 
cooperative in the face of the ROK’s IMF crisis and the North Korean missile test-fire 
in the late 1990s. Their relations reached the peak of cooperation in this period. As 
rapidly as it emerged in this period, their cooperation was soon terminated in 2001. 
However, as the two states confronted the second North Korean nuclear crisis, they 
attempted to improve their deteriorated relationship and paved a road for cooperation. 
Once more, this cooperation did not last long as the ROK president proclaimed a 
diplomatic war against Japan and cancelled a summit with the Japanese Prime 
Minister in the face of the second territorial dispute and history textbook issue in 2005.  
 
Parsimonious IR Paradigms 
 The main purpose of this section is to explore the theoretical insights of the 
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three prevailing IR paradigms. The existence of the volatility of Japan-ROK relations 
itself is a sufficient reason for the inapplicability of each IR research tradition to study 
it. As a result, their relations are anomalous for each IR paradigm. However, each IR 
paradigm produces valuable insights for certain issues. Volatile Japan-ROK relations 
can be explained if we selectively use and combine these insights, the essence of a 
pluralist approach. In this context, to make sufficient and adequate explanations for 
the volatility of Japan-ROK relations, we need to have a good understanding of the 
premises11 of each IR paradigm, which produces different insights and distinctive 
focal points on the forces that cause state behaviors, drive the sources of conflict, and 
foster conditions for peace and stability. 
 Additionally, this section briefly shows that, in addition to the inadequacy of 
each IR paradigm for explaining volatility, each paradigm’s best assumption of Japan-
ROK relations is inadequate because each focuses only on its own research context 
and variables.  
Realism 
 Realism, argues Michael Doyle (1997: 41), “is our dominant theory. Most 
international relations scholars are either self-identified or readily identifiable 
Realists.” Realists hold a skeptical attitude toward schemes for peaceful international 
order and are the theorists of the “the state of war” (Doyle 1997: 42). Not surprisingly, 
realism does not consist of an explicit set of assumptions and propositions. The realist 
school of thought takes several forms. Mearsheimer (2003) divides realism into three 
                                            
11 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to review comprehensively every assumption and 
proposition that each IR paradigm or sub-perspective of each IR paradigm proposes.  
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sub-groups (human nature realism, defensive realism, and offensive realism) and 
Robert Jervis (1999) makes a twofold categorization (defensive and offensive realism).  
Despite various sub-realism theories and their different virtues, realists share 
several important insights on the portrayal of world politics.12 For realists (e.g., 
Morgenthau 1961; Waltz 1979; Walt 1985; Mearsheimer 2003), the international 
system is best described as a condition of anarchy in which no ultimate authority 
exists to govern relations among states. In anarchy, states are the principle actors and 
constantly confront a security dilemma in which an increase in one state’s security 
decreases the security of others. They must seek their survival, a prerequisite to 
achieving any goals, through the principle of self-help. They struggle for power and 
their computation about power dominates their action. In this context, international 
politics is fundamentally driven by power distribution (or, distribution of capabilities) 
among states. Also, under anarchy war is always possible and genuine peace is not 
likely.  
In addition to the above shared insights, realists share another primary 
consensual insight on interstate relations. That is, balance of power is an inevitable 
strategy in interstate relations for states to achieve their survival under the anarchic 
system if they cannot do better. Balancing power is also vital for states to prevent wars 
and maintain peace in international relations. Realists even view that the diplomacy of 
cooperation between states is rooted in each state’s balancing actions (Morgenthau 
1961). 
                                            
12 For instance, Mearsheimer (1994-95: 2003) epitomizes realists’ shared core assumptions. 
 19  
Balance of power is one of the most frequently used concepts in international 
politics and is the heart of realist strategy (e.g., Walt 1985: 5; Nye 2000). The balance 
of power refers to “an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among 
several nations with approximates of affairs. The balance of power and policies aiming 
at its preservation are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor in a 
society of sovereign nations” (Morgenthau 1961: 176). The primary assumption of the 
balance-of-power theory is that states act to prevent any other state from achieving a 
preponderance of power (Nye 2000). Specifically, there are two fundamental reasons 
why states choose to balance (Walt 1985: 5-7). First, states risk their survival if they 
fail to restrain a potential hegemonic power before it becomes significantly powerful 
and second, joining the weaker side increases the new member’s leverage because the 
more vulnerable side has greater need for help.  
As seen above, there is no doubt that realists regard balancing strategy as 
indispensible for the survival of states in the anarchic system. Yet, for realists the 
concept of power, its definition and measurement, is elusive at best, although they 
share the necessity of the balancing strategy. In place of power, the concept of threat 
was introduced to shed light on states’ balancing behavior. Stephen M. Walt (1985: 8) 
argues that states balance against threats, rather than against power alone so he 
proposed an alternative–the so-called balance of threats theory, based on the rationale 
that “although the distribution of power is an extremely important factor, the level of 
threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived 
intentions.” According to this balance-of-threats theory, states tend to align one with 
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another when the level of threats increases. As a consequence, it seems that the 
balance-of-threats theory, which offers a richer theoretical framework of states’ 
balancing behavior,13 is a better alternative than the balance-of-power theory.  
Despite their different insights on power and threats between the balance-of-
power and balance-of-threats theorists, realists agree on the core principle of balancing. 
There is no doubt for realists that since states are in a security dilemma under anarchy, 
a balancing strategy is the most prudent way to assure states’ survival.  
Inadequacy: Realism makes various predictions and suggests implications 
for the balancing behavior of interstate relations, but often fails to infer correctly the 
direction of balancing. This is mainly because its assumptions about the direction of 
balancing are limited to exploring material factors, without considering theoretical 
assumptions that invoke the formation of interests and threats or on any mechanism 
for understanding the shifts in threat perception and identities. Realist balancing 
theory alone cannot speak to the direction of states’ balancing behavior if it does not 
borrow insights from other IR perspectives (e.g., constructivism).  
Realism proposes that Japan and South Korea should cooperate with each 
other because they confront common adversaries—China and North Korea. For 
instance, as soon as the Cold War ended, realists predicted the advent of multi-polar 
system in Northeast Asia calling it “Ripe for Rivalry” (Friedberg 1993) and “Emerging 
Structure” (Waltz 1993) and envisioned a dangerous and conflictive security 
                                            
13 Balance-of-threats theory fails to provide the mechanism for explaining why states 
differently perceive threats, which makes it subject to serious criticism (Katzenstein et al. 
1996). 
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environment in the region.14 To prevent this instability, Mearsheimer (2001) argued 
that the regional balance of power grouping among the US, the ROK, and Japan 
against China, a potential disruptive force of the regional status-quo system in 
Northeast Asia, was inevitable.  
However, the reality of Japan-ROK relations has not, in general, reflected this 
realist view. Three examples illustrate the point. First, Japan and the ROK have 
remained reluctant to conclude a bilateral defense treaty, despite confronting serious 
common threats and pressure from the United States. Second, it still remains uncertain 
whether Japan and the ROK have worked together with the US to balance China. 
Japan has been reluctant to work with the United States particularly to contain or 
balance China, although it has barely made efforts to break its security dependence on 
the US (Green 2001; Grims 2003). In this context, Green (2001) argues that post-Cold 
War Japan acted with so-called “reluctant realism” behavior for most of the period. 
That is, for most of the post-Cold War period, Japan has pursued its China policy 
separately from strengthening its solidarity with the US. It has also been discussed by 
some Japanese politicians that Japan might recognize China’s hegemony in the region 
and drop a policy of comprehensive remilitarization (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 
110). In this vein, Japan has seen a friendly relationship with China (Green 2001). 
Likewise, the ROK has not met the realist prediction that it would work with the US 
and Japan to balance China. During the post-Cold War era, South Korea has sought to 
                                            
14 Waltz emphasizes the role of economic interests and competition in the globalizing post-
Cold War era. For instance, “Economic competition is often as keen as military competition 
and since nuclear weapons limit the use of force among great powers at the strategic level, we 
may expect economic and technological competition among them to become more intense” 
(Waltz 1993: 59). 
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maintain a friendly relationship with its traditional partner and ally, the US, as well as 
with China, contrary to the Cold-War period. While South Korea has undergone shifts 
in the domestic and international environment in the post-Cold War, it has begun to 
worry about the issue of entrapment—“being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s 
interests that one does not share, or shares only partially”15(Chung 2001). South Korea 
has sought to avoid involvement in the US-Sino relations since the Kim Dae-Jung 
government. For South Korea, China has been definitely neither an entity for 
containment nor a strategic supplement for leaving the alliance with the United States. 
Interestingly, the ROK finds the rationale for the continuation of the US force 
presence on the Korean peninsula in Japan, because it envisions that Japan would not 
re-militarize swiftly to compete against China as far as the US force stays in Japan and 
the ROK (e.g., Christensen 2003; Kim and Glosserman 2004). 
Third, even when both states simultaneously confronted a provocative and 
emergent security threat from North Korea, South Korea and Japan have been 
contentious and reluctant to work together to balance the DPRK ( e.g., their conflictive 
relations in 1996 and their conflictive relations in 2005).  
Consequently, the inadequacy of the realist balancing theory is found in the 
fact that realism assumes the direction of states’ balancing without understanding the 
effect of ideational factors on interstate relations. To understand why there is the gap 
between the behavior of South Korea and Japan and the realist assumptions on the 
direction of balancing, it is necessary to explore ideational factors.  
                                            
15 Snyder (1984: 467). 
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Liberalism  
Like realism, there are diverse research forms and theoretical insights in 
liberalism. However, it seems safe to claim that there are three shared assumptions of 
the liberal school of thought (Moravcsik 1997: 516-520). The three assumptions are: 
(1) the fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and privates groups 
who utilize organized exchange and collective action to promote differentiated 
interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and 
variations in societal influence; (2) states represent some subset of domestic society, 
on the basis that state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world 
politics; and (3) the configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state 
behavior.  
 As implied in their assumptions, unlike realists, liberals envision that a state is 
not a black box. They hold a more benign and optimistic perspective on global politics 
than do realists who assume that an increase in one state’s interest gain decreases the 
interest gain of others. They are, in general, interested in cooperation between states 
(Grieco 1988). For liberals, cooperation among states takes place within the anarchic 
system, although anarchy plays a role in constraining state motives and actions. States 
seek various goals, security being one of them. As states are able to act under the 
principle of “tit for tat” through persistent interactions, they can realize that mutual 
cooperation is the best long-term strategy, ensuring that states can cooperate with each 
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other (Axelrod 1984).16 In addition, states do not resort directly to violence or 
repression to resolve the conflicts of interests and institutions can serve as means and 
mediators to resolve issues. As a result, some liberals envision a world in which, not 
merely states, but also other actors participate in world affairs, in which a clear 
hierarchy of issues does not exist, and in which military force is not effective 
instrument of policy (Keohane and Nye 1977). 
  This liberals’ optimistic view of global politics is associated with several 
fundamental trends (Berger 2000). The first is the increase of trade and economic 
interdependence17 throughout the world. The second is the proliferation of 
international norms, institutions, and regimes designed to regulate and coordinate 
cooperation among states. The third is the growing role of international and domestic 
institutions in world politics. 
 According to liberals, states dwell in a world of economic interdependence 
such that cooperation among states is essential and shared economic interests create a 
demand for international institutions and rules (Keohane 1984). Increased 
international transactions such as trade and the mobility of capital supported by 
technological developments lead to economic interdependence among states. This 
economic interdependence makes the costs of conflicts higher. International 
institutions (or regimes) are created to manage issues stemming from increased 
                                            
16 Axelrod (1984: 173) argues that “the two key requisites for cooperation to thrive are that the 
cooperation be based on reciprocity, and that the shadow of the future is important enough to 
make this reciprocity stable.” 
17 Interdependence (the so-called mutual or reciprocal dependence) refers to “situations 
characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” 
(Keohane and Nye 1977: 7) 
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international flows and interactions. These institutions in turn play a significant role in 
resolving the conflict of interests, aiding in cooperation, and reducing the severity of 
the security dilemma. Joseph Nye Jr. (2000: 45) argues that institutions stabilize 
peaceful expectations that anarchy is limited and stabilized by institutions in four 
ways: (1) institutions provide a sense of continuity; (2) they provide an opportunity for 
reciprocity; (3) they increase transparency and the flow of information; and (4) they 
afford ways to resolve conflicts. International institutions also help actors to cooperate 
not only by changing repeated practices, rules, and principles, but also by changing the 
properties of actors. 
The positive effect of economic interdependence and international institutions 
is enhanced in democratic states. A dyad is more peaceful if it features democracies, 
economic interdependence, and membership in international institutions—the so-
called “triangulating peace” argument (Russet and Oneal 2001). Moreover, democracy 
alone has a positive impact on international relations as democracies rarely go a war 
against each other—the so-called “democratic peace theory” (e.g., Doyle 1992; Russet 
1993).18 One reasoning of the democratic peace argument is that democratic 
institutions and norms inhibit the use of aggression. Democratic citizens tend to abhor 
violence and constrain their leaders from pursing aggressive violent foreign policies. 
Institutional constraints of democracy also restrain leaders and therefore reduce the 
                                            
18 See Russet (1993: 4) “(a) Democracies rarely fight each other (an empirical statement) 
because (b) they have other means of resolving conflicts between them and therefore do not 
need to fight each other (a prudential statement), and (c) they perceive that democracies 
should not fight each other (a normative statement about principles of right behavior), which 
reinforces the empirical statement.” Therefore, as democratic peace theorists believe that 
democratic states are likely to exercise peaceful restraints and negotiate rather than escalate 
disputes (e.g., Doyle 1992: 308-309), 
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chance of war. The other reasoning of the argument is that multilateral institutions 
which tie democracies together tend to constrain states’ use of violence.   
 Inadequacy: Apparently, the liberals’ best assumption for Japan-ROK 
relations is that the two states should have friendly relations because they are the only 
dyad in Northeast Asia which satisfies all three requirements for a peaceful 
relationship (democracy, international institutions, and economic interdependence). 
However, reality does not mirror this view. The liberal theoretical framework lacks the 
capability to account for Japan-ROK relations. We should be careful about applying 
liberals’ grand propositions to these relations, since liberalism does not have its own 
theoretical assumptions about the impact of ideational factors on relations. For 
instance, promotion of democracy as a positive value does not always generate the 
outcome which democratic peace theorists anticipate. The proposition that the bilateral 
relationship between the ROK and Japan is likely to be cooperative is problematic at 
best. This is because this liberal proposition is established neither through an 
exploration of whether the ROK and Japan share the identities and norms of 
democracy, nor through an analysis of what democracy has done for the nationalist 
identity conflicts between the ROK and Japan.  
In addition, the impact of international security institutions on their relations 
is ambiguous, since liberalism does not have theoretical assumptions that invoke the 
formation of interests and identities. Liberals would expect that the security 
coordination and cooperation through the trilateral alliance system between Japan, 
South Korea, and the United States should have paved the way for the cooperative 
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Japan-ROK relations. However, reality does not mirror this view. 
The US-ROK alliance has lasted more than five decades and has been the 
symbol of cooperation between the United States and South Korea. The United States 
Forces in Korea (USFK) has provided military support for South Korea. To manage 
and maintain the cooperative alliance system, South Korea and the United States have 
regularly hosted summit talks, conferences, and annual meetings such as the ROK-US 
Military Committee Meeting (MCM), the ROK-US Security Policy Initiative Meeting 
(SPIM), and the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). In this context, it would be 
expected that the more than fifty year-old US-ROK alliance has been efficient and 
effective, not merely in consolidating a cooperative relationship between the United 
States and the ROK, but also in generating mutually positive images. Yet, reality in the 
post-Cold War period has revealed that the effects of the alliance are ambiguous. The 
US-ROK alliance relations have evolved continuously and the significance of the 
alliance to the ROK has eroded during a process in which a profound shift in power 
distribution took place on the Korean peninsula and South Korean national power, 
wealth, and international status increased (Chung 2001; Kang et al. 2003). Evidently, 
the over 50 year-old US-ROK alliance could not help prevent the South Korean 
population’s perception that the need for a friendly relationship with the US had 
diminished. In 2005 a opinion poll by Dong-A Newspaper, respondents answered that 
the United States is more threatening to the security of South Korea than is China.19 
The alliance also had no way to stop South Korea from demanding that the United 
                                            
19 April 31, 2005.  http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/poll-05-2.htm 
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States hands over to the ROK the war-time Operational Control (OPCON), which had 
been assigned to a general of the United States since the Korean War of 1950.  
Security cooperation between the ROK and Japan through the trilateral 
alliance system has frequently been trivial or nominal. As Cha (1997-a) points out, the 
southern triangle relationship among the US, Japan, and South Korea has not 
completed establishing a third leg of the bilateral alliance between South Korea and 
Japan. In addition, there have been several attempts to establish security cooperation 
between them through institutional efforts, but, there have existed no influential 
security institutions which have successfully tied South Korea and Japan and, as a 
consequence brought a cooperative relationship between them. For example, in 
October 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework to 
dismantle a North Korea’s nuclear program, and the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization), which included the Unites States, Japan, and South Korea, 
was created in 1995 to implement the key provisions of the Agreed Framework. 
However, the KEDO was disbanded by the Bush Administration in 2003 without 
realizing its expectations. Since the Taepo-dong missile test-firing, the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea have made efforts to build a coordinated policy toward North 
Korea under the trilateral coordination and oversight group (TCOG), which was 
created to feature a coordinated approach to North Korea. Nonetheless, South Korea 
has frequently not agreed on policies formulated by the cooperation between the Bush 
administration and Koizumi government. For instance, the ROK joined neither the US-
led missile defense program, nor the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) program.  
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Consequently, the inadequacy of liberalism is derived from the fact that it 
posits the positive roles of interdependence, democracy, and institutions in global 
politics without delving into the effect of ideational factors on Japan-ROK relations. 
To understand why there is the gap between the foreign policy behavior of the two 
states and the liberal grand propositions, it is necessary to explore ideal factors, such 
as identities, norms, and shared ideas.  
Constructivism  
Constructivism is “about human consciousness and its role in international 
life” (Ruggie 1998: 856). Specifically, it is an approach which claims that human 
interaction is primarily guided by intersubjectively shared ideational factors, not solely 
material factors, while criticizing the rationalists’ core assumption that collective 
action should be analyzed in the context “which takes self-interested actors as constant 
and exogenously given and focuses on the selective incentives that might induce them 
to cooperate” (Wendt 1994: 384).20  
Constructivism assumes emphasizes the socially constructed nature of global 
politics and its focal spheres of research are, in general, interests, identities, norms, 
knowledge, culture, and the role of ideas. It assumes that interests and identities are 
not exogenous, but are the products of the social practices that mutually constitute 
actors and social structures. It also envisions that intersubjectively shared ideas serve 
as an ideational structure which is able not only to constrain and shape actors’ 
behavior and interests, but also to guide actors to redefine their interests and identities, 
                                            
20 Wendt (1999: 27 and 33-40) argues that rationalism is a perspective that focuses on the 
logic of choice under constraints and treats identity and interests as exogenously given. 
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while this ideational structure is also reproduced and altered by the discursive 
practices of actors (Copeland 2000). However, constructivism is not a substantive 
theory in that it neither makes any generalizable claims about the content of 
ideational/social structure or the nature of actors at work in global politics, nor 
produces any generalizable predictions of political behavior. In essence, a social 
structure is neutral with respect to cooperation and conflict among actors. Substantive 
explanations and predictions of political behavior are always dependent upon what the 
content of ideational/social structure is, what the relevant actors are, and what they 
want. Constructivism is therefore “a social theory that makes claims about the nature 
of social life and social change” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 393).  
As already implied above, in the eyes of constructivists, identities play an 
important role in global politics. The nature of the interactions between actors is not 
simply the product of objective material factors. Interests imply choices and actions 
but are the product of identities. “Identities are the basis of interests” (Wendt 1992: 
398). They are constructed through a process of social interaction. Identities perform 
three necessary functions in a society: they tell individuals who they are and they tell 
individuals who others are. Actors are able to distinguish self from other through 
identities; they are able identify who is a friend, rival, or enemy through their 
identities. In this vein, in telling an individual who they are, identities strongly imply 
“a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in 
particular domains, and with respect to particular actors” (Hopf 1998: 175). While 
interacting with one another, actors can recall different identities dependent upon the 
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salience of issues and attribute different identities to others. As a consequence the shift 
in their identities leads to the changes of interests.  
 Constructivism also emphasizes the role of norms in global politics. For 
constructivists, a norm, defined as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with 
a given identity,”21serves as a social structure which can provide actors with 
understandings of their interests. It emerges and pervades in the process of 
socialization and exists as practices, or shared knowledge. In some situations, norms 
“operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having ‘constitutive effects’ 
that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity. 
In other situations, norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an 
already defined identity” (Katzenstein et al. 1996: 5). In such instances, norms are an 
important constraint on human behaviors and inform actors about what they ought to 
do and avoid—norms have "regulative" effects that specify standards of appropriate 
action. It is difficult for an actor to engage in an act which a norm considers as an 
inappropriate one (Finnmore and Sikkink 1998). Consequently, norms either define (or 
constitute) identities, or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they do both (Katzenstein 
et al. 1996).  
 Through analyzing identities and norms, constructivism has returned IR 
students to several important foundational questions. For instance, constructivists 
suggest that national security does not always depend on relative military capabilities. 
They emphasize the socially constructed context of threats by arguing that simply 
                                            
21 Finnmore and Sikkink (1998: 891). 
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computing relative military capabilities does not imply anything about the behavior of 
states without looking at the identities of states. The very evident case of this 
assumption is that the US is concerned more about the few nuclear weapons of North 
Korea than the numerous nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom. Understanding the 
role of the identities of states in interstate relations is integral to accounting for this 
case. States’ identities are shaped through their interactions. States understand others 
according to the identity they attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing 
their own identity (Hopf 1998). These state identities shape the state’s preferences and 
consequent actions. In this vein, states are able to distinguish “us” with from “them” 
through identities and can attribute friendship or antagonism to other states.22 If a state 
identifies another state as a threat, it would not be surprising for the first state to 
assume a hostile and aggressive stance toward the latter. This logic leads Hammer and 
Katzenstein (2002: 584) to argue that “a threat is rooted not solely in differential 
material capabilities but also in the view of the difference between self and other that 
shapes interpretations of actor intentions and interests.” National security is not 
explained simply by looking at material factors, such as relative military capability 
and distribution of capabilities. It also involves social factors, such as culture, 
identities, and norms.  
Moreover, constructivists find fault in realists’ core assumption that anarchy 
is inherently a zero sum-oriented, self-help system in which states negatively identify 
with each other threats. They claim that anarchy explains little by itself and does not 
                                            
22 Nationalism is collective identity par excellence and national identity is dependent upon 
how a nation exclusively identity itself from other nations.  
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propose any a priori structure of anarchy, and that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ 
(Wendt 1992). For constructivists, there is no logic of anarchy apart from social 
practices that reproduce and transform state’s view of self and other. There can be 
various anarchic cultures including enmity, rivalry, and friendship. The anarchic 
culture depends on the social practices among states. In each anarchic culture, states 
play certain types of roles vis-à-vis one another, complete with certain behavior norms. 
For instance, in a culture of anarchy characterized by enmity, states cast each other in 
the role of “enemy” and use violence to resolve issues. Yet, this culture of anarchy is 
sustained only if states continue to identify each other as enemies. This leads to the 
suggestion that anarchy is what states make of it.  
Therefore, constructivist theoretical framework is best suited to the analysis of 
“how identities and interests can change over time, thereby producing subtle shifts in 
the behavior of states and occasionally triggering far reaching but unexpected shifts in 
international affairs” (Walt 1998: 44). In addition, focusing on norms and collective 
identity, one of the most essential implications for interstate relations that 
constructivists suggest is that cooperation is unlikely to take place unless two states 
share norms and consider each other as a “we” (Katzenstein et al 1996; Telhami and 
Barnett 2002).  
Inadequacy: The best constructivist prediction for Japan-ROK relations in 
the post-Cold War period would be friction. Constructivists would see that Japan and 
the ROK had not overcome enmity derived from historical antagonism and that has 
served as a primary cognitive and ideational structure for South Koreans and 
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Japanese.23 Also, they would argue that identities and norms between the ROK and 
Japan have grown apart in the changes in the domestic and international security 
environment and the recurrent rises of colonial past and territorial issues. They would 
conclude that Korean-Japanese perceptions of threats and interests had grown apart, 
and that, consequently, the two states would have produced non-cooperative and 
contentious relationship.  
This constructivist explanation is, however, sufficient and adequate only for 
conflictive relations. It is difficult for constructivists to explain that, despite the effect 
of norms and nationalist identity conflicts on their relations, Japan and South Korea 
have also worked together from time to time. For instance, South Korea and Japan 
held the defense ministry meeting and legislators meeting and attempted to make a 
coordinated policy toward North Korea. They have also had a variety of the practices 
of security cooperation such as Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), Search and 
Rescue (SAR) drill, Working-Level Policy Meetings, Defense Minister Summits, and 
Port Calls. In addition, South Korean leaders have attempted to limit the harmful 
impact of colonial issues and territorial disputes on Japan-ROK relations and lead to 
future-oriented relations with Japan by utilizing new policy ideas24 (e.g., Kim Dae 
Jung’s Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century), while Japanese leaders have 
similarly attempted to establish a peaceful relationship with ROK (e.g., Hosokawa 
                                            
23 Cha (1997-a: 23) also points out that mutual enmity constitutes the baseline of the ROK-
Japanese interactions.  
24 Ideas are also important factor in governmental policy initiative. According to Goldstein and 
Keohane (1993: 3), “Ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody 
provide road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends mean relationships, when 
they affect outcomes of strategic situation in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when 
they become embedded in political institutions.” 
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apology, and Murayama formal apology, Obuchi’s Korea-Japan Partnership for the 
21st Century, and Koizumi’s shuttle diplomacy with Roh Moo Hyun government).  
 Constructivism, thus, fails to explain the cooperative side of the relationship 
between the ROK and Japan. This is because constructivism does not have theoretical 
insights into a sudden change of an actor’s behavior, instead, focusing on how the past 
shapes the way actors understand their present circumstances (Copleland 2000). 
Consequently, constructivism does not make generalizable predictions about when the 
changes in political behavior will occur. 
 
Theoretical Approach of the Study 
 
Pluralist Approach 
 The idea of pluralist approach is derived from that of analytical eclecticism 
which aims to solve anomalies by selectively combining insights from realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism. This analytical eclecticism is articulated by IR scholars 
who argue that IR perspectives tend to account for world politics only within their 
own research context and ignore the advantages of other perspectives’ explanations 
(e.g., Katzenstein and Okawara 2001; Katzenstein and Sil 2004). According to such 
scholars, focusing exclusively on one IR perspective and excluding the others is less 
valuable than “making sense of empirical anomalies and stripping notions of what is 
natural of their intuitive plausibility” (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 97). “Drawing 
upon clusters of empirical observations, causal logics, and interpretations spanning 
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different research traditions” is critical to solving an abnormal problem in world 
politics (Katzenstein and Sil 2004: 16). In addition, the complex links among power, 
interest, and norms defy analytic capture by any one IR paradigm, and can be made 
more intelligible by drawing selectively on different IR paradigmatic traditions 
(Katzenstein and Okawara 2001: 154). For these reasons, it is argued that analytical 
eclecticism is an alternative which is able to demonstrate the difficulties of IR 
perspectives in making sense of important cases, and explain and interpret a set of 
observations that are abstract, irrational, or cannot be understood by a single IR 
perspective (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001).  
Yet there is a difference between the pluralist approach and analytical 
eclecticism, although the pluralist approach is a problem-solving approach like 
analytical eclecticism and shares analytical eclecticism’s theoretical insights. 
Analytical eclecticism tends to neglect diverse observations and substantive 
descriptions that lack IR theoretical considerations,25 whereas the pluralist approach 
includes these. It is critical to grasp field observations and area specialists’ 
descriptive/narrative views for identifying important factors that are potentially critical 
in recognizing and accounting for a problem but are barely identifiable in IR theories. 
This is implied in the criticism that IR theories are inadequate to explain security 
dynamics in Northeast Asia because these theories do not reflect the impact of history, 
culture, and tradition on security relationships among Northeast Asian countries (e.g., 
                                            
25 Similarly, Young W. Kihl (2006: 1) also makes a plea for going beyond analytical 
eclecticism in rethinking security in East Asia and argues a ‘syncretistic approach’ which aims 
to combine research traditions of field observation and participatory analysis with a clear set 
of theoretical concerns.  
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Cha 1997; Berger 2000; Kang 2003; Hwang 2003).26 It is inadequate to combine 
selectively different IR theories to explain, in particular, an anomalous problem 
without grasping the problem and its elements through field observation and 
descriptions and insights from diverse disciplines. Simply mixing IR theories for an 
abnormal problem may easily produce an inadequate and overly parsimonious account. 
For this reason, the pluralist approach first focuses on identifying and grasping 
important factors in a problem with the help of the area specialists’ 
descriptive/narrative views. It then focuses on accounting for the problem by a set of 
the eclectically chosen IR research paradigms. Accordingly, a pluralist approach is 
able to complement the methodological weakness of analytical eclecticism. In this 
vein, a pluralist approach is able to go beyond analytical eclecticism in accounting for 
post-Cold War Japan-ROK relations. 
There are a variety of the advantages in the pluralist approach. The pluralist 
approach helps us to sever the link between IR research perspectives and the 
substantive interpretations constructed within them. That prevents us from looking 
only at certain preselected variables and particular aspects of a problem. It also helps 
us to recognize that an observation or claim by different IR perspectives can converge 
in wider implications, despite their differences regarding foundations, methodology, 
and domains of inquiry (Katzenstein and Sil 2004). Finally, a pluralist approach can 
account for issues without leaving behind important anomalies, although it may be 
criticized for a lack of parsimony.  
                                            
26 I acknowledge that this criticism is mainly directed at rationalist theories (e.g., realism, neo-
realism, liberalism, neo-liberal institutionalism), rather than constructivism. 
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Japan-ROK Relations and the Case for a Pluralist Approach 
As briefly discussed above, this study advocates a pluralist approach to 
account for volatile Japan-ROK relations in the post-Cold War era. There are three 
principal theoretical perspectives available to explain these relations. None, however, 
proves adequate. The fact that this relationship has been cooperative and conflictive is 
sufficient evidence for the inapplicability of three mainstream IR research traditions to 
explain it. However, this anomalous relationship is explained if we selectively use and 
combine theoretical insights of the three IR paradigms.  
During the post-Cold War period, South Korea and Japan have undergone 
fundamental shifts in their domestic and international political environments. 
Externally, the end of the Cold War led to the collapse of the security competition 
between the USSR-North Korea-China Northern Triangle and the US-ROK-Japan 
Southern Triangle. It provided the two Asian countries with the possibility to 
implement new foreign policies and seek more independent security arrangements. 
Internally, Japan has experienced a rise of neo-conservatism, the collapse of Social 
Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), a revival of nationalism, and a growing right-wing 
movement (Lee 2006), whereas South Korea has undergone a rise of nationalism, 
improvement in inter-Korean relations, and democratization (Kim 2006).  
These shifts have led to the emergence of various intervening factors that 
contributed to the volatility of their relations; these factors will be analyzed in detail 
throughout the following sections. First, South Korea has worried about Japan’s re-
militarization and expansionism (Cha 2000; Christensen 2003; Kim 2006; Lee 2006), 
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whereas Japan has been concerned about losing its power influence on the Korean 
Peninsula and the possibility of a collapse of the status quo security environment in 
Korea (Cha 2000; Kim and Glosserman 2004). Second, inter-Korean relations have 
improved over time, whereas Japan-North Korean relations have not improved but 
become exacerbated, making it difficult for Japan and South Korea to coordinate 
policy toward North Korean issues (Kim 2006). Third, there has been little consensus 
among the US, Japan, the ROK as to whether China is a new threat (Shambaugh 2004). 
Fourth, public support for the US troops in both South Korea and Japan has begun to 
decline, and the US-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation system has sometimes been 
ineffective (Kim and Glosserman 2004: 8). Fifth, the US-ROK alliance and the US-
Japan alliances have begun to move in different directions. In general, the US-Japan 
alliance has been strengthened but the US-ROK alliance has shown a downward 
tendency (e.g.,Kim and Glosserman 2004; Kim 2006; Nam, Sakata, and Dujarric 
2006). Sixth, there has been an increase in the number of the issues involving 
historical antagonism between South Korea and Japan, which greatly contributed to 
intensifying mutual enmity derived from historical animosity and constituted the 
baseline of Japan-ROK relations since the close of the colonial period.  
Under these changing environments, the two countries’ foreign policy 
outcomes have not been determined solely by realist material security dynamics, 
liberal interdependence dynamics, or constructivist identity and norm dynamics. 
Nonetheless, the fact that post-Cold War Japan-ROK relations have been often 
contentious and conflictive attracts us to favor constructivism to study their relations. 
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As constructivism suggests, past colonial issues have been an important sphere in the 
study of the relationship between Japan and South Korea more than ever before. There 
is no doubt that their relationship has been contentious and unstable in the recurrent 
rise of the past colonial and territorial issues which have pushed the two countries into 
conflicts involving their nationalist identities (i.e. de facto conflicts between anti-
Japanese identity among Koreans and nationalist identity among Japanese) and, as a 
consequence, enmity derived from historical antagonism has continuously served as a 
primary ideational structure for South Koreans and Japanese. In addition, as some of 
the past colonial issues were more salient than others; in some cases, sufficiently 
conflictive to cause cancellation of summit talks or recall of an ambassador. 
As already discussed, constructivism alone cannot account for volatile Japan-
ROK relations, although it offers critical insights for their conflict. In fact, Japan and 
the ROK have not always been in conflict with each other. As other contingent issues 
have emerged, it has been difficult for them to discount or entirely ignore the need for 
cooperation. They have cooperated with each other in the process of managing other 
important contingent issues owing to the three factors; first, North Korea has 
continuously engaged in provocative activities; second, both Japan and South Korea 
have shared a similar economic system and are economically interdependent; third, 
while Japan and South Korea have been allies of the United States, the uncertain 
foreign policy of the US has affected their relations. 
Diplomatic cooperation, for instance, occurred when the two countries were 
simultaneously threatened by North Korea, resulting in a shift from friction to 
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cooperation. Their cooperative relationship can not be explained by a single IR 
paradigm. Such cooperation is explained by a combination of the realists’ balancing 
logic and the constructivists’ collective anti-communist identity and norms. As 
discussed in the section of the essence of IR paradigms, realism offers insights as to 
how threats affect the behavior of the two countries but does not provide insights into 
why their relations suddenly stop being affected by conflicts of nationalist identity. 
Constructivism is able to explain these through the analysis of the shifts in the 
hierarchy of identities and norms. If an issue evokes one or a few of an actor’s various 
identities, the hierarchy of the actor’s identities changes according to the salience of 
the issue (Ferguson and Mansbach 2000: 151) and if the hierarchy alters the interests 
of the actor, as constructivism suggests, there is a shift in the actor’s subsequent action. 
In this sense, if we combine the insights of realism and constructivism, we can 
formulate a critical theoretical framework for their cooperative bilateral behavior. This 
framework suggests the following: Japan and the ROK had shaped anti-communist 
identity through the collective efforts to work against the communist bloc. This 
collective identity had been another primary baseline of the Japan-ROK interactions, 
among others. When they were jointly threatened by North Korean provocations, these 
became the most salient issue between them. Their survival and security, as realists 
(e.g., Waltz 1979; Walt 1985) suggest, became a primary concern. Realism, however, 
does not explain why they did act cooperatively when both had the security guarantor 
– the US. In this context, realism alone cannot explain this dynamic. To account for 
this, constructivist insights are indispensable. When they were threatened, their 
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“nested” anti-communist identity was recalled.27 This collective identity was also 
strengthened by the security imperative that the two countries faced immediately after 
the threatening action. This collective identity became the basis of the foreign policies 
of the two states and served as a basis for imposing the need for cooperative 
exchanges between the two states. Thus, Japan and the ROK could shape mutual 
interests to cope jointly with this threatening issue and frame a united front toward 
North Korea. They also could disregard other conflictive issues between them.  
As a consequence, to account for post-Cold War ROK-Japan relations, which 
have often been conflictive owing to the recurrent emergence of past colonial issues 
but could not always be conflictive owing to other contingent salient issues, we will be 
successful if we use a pluralist approach which is capable of analyzing material and 
ideational factors simultaneously through selectively combining the theoretical 
insights from different IR paradigms.  
 
Pluralist Accounts for Japan-ROK relations 
 
The purpose of this section is to use pluralist accounts to explain the volatile 
Japan-ROK relations in the post-Cold War, especially in two specific periods. This is 
because analyzing such volatile relations in these two periods is sufficient enough to 
illustrate why their relations have been conflictive and cooperative and why the 
relations are explained by a pluralist approach. The first part focuses on their relations 
                                            
27 The concept of nesting helps to understand this phenomenon. Nesting refers to process by 
which “memories and myths are enshrined and old identities handed down, making them 
available for revival or refurbishing.” (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004: 170). 
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in the period of the emergence of the three episodes (the Tokto territorial dispute, the 
South Korean IMF crisis, and the North Korean Taepo-Dong missile test). The second 
part deals with their relations in the period of the eruptions of the events (the Second 
North Korean Nuclear crisis, the textbook issue, and the second territorial dispute). 
 
Japan-ROK Relations 1996 To 1999 
The Tokto Crisis and the Peak of Their Cooperative Relations  
The contentious relationship between Japan and South Korea climaxed in the 
emergence of the territorial dispute in 1996. Tokto, two islands surrounded by a group 
of tiny, rocky and uninhabited islets, is located in the body of water called the East Sea 
(or Sea of Japan), and some 87 kilometers east of South Korea’s Ullung island and 157 
kilometers northwest of Oki, Japan’s westernmost island. Tokto has been a territory of 
Korea for most of written history, but it was governed by Japan for the 41 years of the 
colonial period (Choi 2005). The South Korean government deployed a band of 
Korean police officials on Tokto in 1952, and they have occupied it since. 
The first Tokto territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan erupted in 
1952. The ROK proclaimed sovereignty over the adjacent seas on January 8, 1952. 
Japan protested against that proclamation. Since then, a series of territorial disputes 
have taken place as Japan occasionally denounces the ROK’s occupation of the islands. 
However, the first crisis-level territorial dispute erupted in 1996. It occurred as the 
ROK’s Kim Young-Sam administration announced a plan to construct a wharf facility 
on Tokto on February 7, 1996, and the Hashimoto government in Japan protested 
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against the plan one day after the announcement. The Japanese Foreign Minister 
Yukihiko Ikeda publicly proclaimed “Takeshima is a Japanese territory.”28  
In response to the Japan’s sovereignty claim, the ROK government issued a 
set of strong countermeasures. President Kim announced that he would not tolerate 
further Japanese provocations and warned Japan to correct its ill-conceived claims and 
remarks on Tokto, as well as other, past colonial issues. The government cancelled the 
scheduled President’s meeting with a delegation of the Japanese ruling coalition led by 
Yamasaki Taku, chair of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council. In addition, 
South Korean news media simultaneously released news that Cheongwadae (the 
President House) considered canceling all scheduled diplomatic exchanges with Japan, 
including the scheduled summit during the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM).29 Moreover, 
various groups which focused on the colonial past and territorial issues led to the so-
called “Tokto movement” in South Korea (Choi 2005: 470). In Japan, however, the 
government did nothing to appease the ROK’s anger. In July, 1996, a member of a 
Japan’s right-wing group (Okoku Kenseito / Imperial Constitutional Government 
Party) dashed his car into the gate of the Korean embassy in Tokyo, set the car on fire, 
and claimed Japanese sovereignty over Tokto. In addition, Japan’s right wing parties, 
including LDP, asserted the Japanese sovereignty over Tokto as an election pledge for 
general elections to the lower house, which were scheduled for October 20, 1996 
(Choi 2005: 480). In response to the Japanese politicians’ claims, South Korean 
lawmakers passed bills aimed at preserving the ecosystem on Tokto during September 
                                            
28 www.koreahearld.com, February 8, 1996.  
29 Donga Ilbo February 11, 1996 
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1997’s regular National Assembly session to assure the ROK’s sovereignty over the 
island. This led to Japan’s official protests to the ROK. Thus, a series of serious 
diplomatic tit-for-tat actions took place during the period of the Tokto dispute. Japan-
ROK relations were consequently contentious and conflictive.  
As the 1997 ROK’s IMF crisis and the 1998 North Korean Taepo-Dong 
missile crisis emerged, South Korea and Japan rapidly began not only to improve their 
chilled relationship, but also to limit the harmful impact of historical colonial issues 
and territorial disputes on their relations by tabling current issues and calling for 
future-oriented relations. On October 8, 1998, Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi and 
the ROK President Kim signed the Joint and Declaration and Action for a New 
Korea-Japan Partnership in the 21st Century at a summit. It was a fundamental step 
for improving their contentious relationship. 
During the summit meeting: 
 
The Prime Minister Obuchi expressed ''deep remorse'' and a ''heartfelt apology'' for 
Japan's colonial and wartime misdeeds, and he said, ''I believe many Japanese people 
share these feelings.'' He also urged the peoples of both countries to take part in joint 
activities to improve bilateral ties. The President Kim stressed the importance of 
mutual efforts to build future-oriented relations by overcoming their unfortunate 
shared history. The two leaders agreed to 1) further reinforce bilateral relations by 
holding bilateral summit meetings regularly and enhancing ministerial talks on 
foreign affairs and other fields, 2) strengthen the role of the United Nations in 
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creating a safer and more peaceful world, 3) acknowledge the importance of 
promoting the construction of light-water reactors in North Korea under the auspices 
of the KEDO, 4) enhance economic cooperation and exchanges including the 
extension of loans from the Export-Import Bank of Japan, 5) make joint efforts 
toward the success of the World Cup soccer tournament in 2002, and 6) promote 
cultural exchanges through opening Japanese mass culture into South Korea. The 
leaders also made a radical but constructive agreement which is the Japanese 
Emperor’s visit to South Korea.30
 
After this declaration, Japan and South Korea carried out policies for the 
provisions of the joint declaration, and implemented confidence-building measures. 
For instance, Japan-ROK relations increasingly featured defense exchanges and 
consultations. In 1999, the Japanese defense agency and South Korean defense 
ministry installed three hotlines for the purpose of security cooperation. In waters 
between the two countries, the South Korean and Japanese navies conducted the first 
joint search and rescue drill consisting of three Maritime SDF destroyers, two ROK 
Navy destroyers, and aerial and intelligence support, engaging in joint formation 
training and tactical maneuvers. In addition, their relations witnessed a significant 
increase in the number of visitors between the two countries. There was half-million 
visitor increase in the number of Japanese tourists in South Korea and a three hundred 
thousand visitor increase in the number of Korean tourists in Japan between 1998 and 
                                            
30 Japantimes, October 8, 1998.  
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2000.31 Moreover, a 500 % increase in the FDI inflows to the ROK from Japan 
occurred.32   
How could Japan and South Korea turn their relations from friction to 
cooperation during this period? What took place in their relations? In addition, what 
caused this shift in their relations? To answer these questions, it is imperative to 
selectively combine the realist, liberal, and constructivist insights. The pluralist 
account helps us shed light on those volatile relations during this period.  
 
Pluralist Explanation 
No single IR perspective is capable of explaining such volatile ROK-Japan 
relations in this period. However, we can adequately explain their conflictive 
relationship by using constructivism. In addition, their cooperative relationship can be 
sufficiently accounted for either by a combination of liberalism and constructivism, or 
by that of realism and constructivism. 
Constructivist Account 
Constructivism can provide critical insights to explain the conflictive relations 
between Japan and South Korea during this period. As already discussed, states 
understand other states according to the identity they attribute to them, while 
simultaneously reproducing their own identity (e.g., Katzenstein et al 1996; Hopf 
1998; Wendt 1999). States are able to distinguish their friends from their adversaries 
through their identities. States, as Wendt (1999) argues, see other states as threats 
                                            
31 Korea Tourism Organization.  
32 Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy of the ROK.  
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under the ideational structure of enmity. Furthermore, they do not cooperate with each 
other if they do not share norms, or share collective identities.  
As these constructivist insights suggest, it would be natural for Japan and the 
ROK to conflict with each other in this period, if for no other reason than their 
conflicts of nationalist identity and mutual enmity derived from historical antagonism, 
which was still a primary ideational structure for South Koreans and Japanese.  
Shifts in the Domestic and International Environment, Nationalist 
Identity Conflicts, and the Tokto Dispute: Before the eruption of the Tokto 
territorial dispute, both countries underwent shifts in domestic and international 
environments. Nationalism in the two Asian states rose dramatically in the process of 
dealing with the domestic and international environmental changes. New norms (e.g., 
a norm of the resolution of the pending issues and colonial legacies in the ROK and a 
norm of a normal Japan in Japan), which could damage their ideational glue 
(structure) that bound them to cooperate with each other, also emerged and pervaded 
both countries. As a result, past colonial and territorial issues and nationalistic 
activities recurrently erupted. This resulted in recalling and strengthening anti-
Japanese identity among Koreans and nationalist identity among Japanese.  
Following the end of Cold-War, the communist bloc collapsed in Northeast 
Asia. The rationale for the provision of the United States’ security guarantees to its 
two allies in the region was undermined, since its alliance with the ROK and Japan 
existed to balance the communist bloc. The US questioned whether it should 
continuously maintain a security presence in the region and reduced its troop strength 
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in Japan and South Korea to some degree in response to the security environment 
change.33 This produced a rise of Japanese uncertainty about the United States’ 
security commitment, while Japan still had a great security concern about “rising” 
China, unstable Russia, and even North Korea (Berger 1993).  
In addition, the United States-led coalition against Saddam Hussein had 
accused Japan of “check-book diplomacy,” failing to appreciate Japan’s $13 billion 
contribution to the first Gulf War (Hayes 2005: 264). Furthermore, growing trade 
issues between the US and Japan erupted, while Japan was suffering unprecedented 
economic recession after the collapse of the bubble economy from the early 1990’s. 
Undoubtedly, these dynamics further increased Japanese uncertainty about their 
security and future. In the meantime, the 1995 Okinawa rape incident resulted in an 
eruption of nation-wide anti-American sentiment in Japan damaging the support for 
continued American troops’ presence (Heginbotham and Samuels 1998). Under these 
circumstances, Japan began to debate seriously whether it should keep pursuing its 
grand Cold War strategy, the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, in which the core aim was to 
spur and improve its economic development while keeping security commitments to 
the lowest level possible by following the lead of the US (Brown 1994).34 A 
                                            
33 On July 31, 1989, the US congress passed the Nunn-Warner revised resolution that called 
for a reduction of the U.S. Forces in South Korea (Suh et al. 2004). A few months later, in 
1990, the George H. W. Bush administration adopted the East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI), 
which involves reductions in US bases and facilities in East Asia. The US performed its 
reduction plan in two phases (1990-1992 and 1992-1995). According to the first phase, the 
United States withdraw 7,000 men from South Korea and 5,000-6,000 soldiers from Japan, 
and the Bush administration withdrew all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in 
1991, as a part of the EASI. Only the first phase was completed as it was planed but the 
second was not (Kang 2000). 
34 Japan did not discard its foreign policy doctrine. The US and Japan attempted to reinforce 
their alliance in the wake of a series of the North Korean threats and the 1995-1996 Taiwan 
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nationwide debate on its appropriate international role in the world had begun.  
The emergence of neo-conservatism consisting mainly of the post-war 
generation and growing Japanese nationalism took place during this period (Matthews 
2003; Lee 2006). Neo-conservative leaders such as secretary-general of the LDP 
(Liberal Democratic Party Ozawa Ichiro and Tokyo governor Sintaro Ishihara 
advocated a more assertive and active international role for Japan by claiming that 
Japan should be able to say “No” to the US. They opposed apologizing for accepting 
guilt for war-time aggression since they considered that criticizing Japan’s role in the 
World War II led to condemnation of Japan’s modern history (Shibuichi 2005: 200). 
Their desire and efforts to develop more independent security policies, increase 
Japan’s military strength, and glorify past imperialist history stimulated to a large 
extent the Japanese nationalism whose core vision is that the Japanese are ethnically 
homogeneous and are superior to and different from other peoples (Berger 1993; 
Inoguchi 2005).35 In addition, these activities greatly contributed to imbuing 
nationalist identity in Japan’s younger generations who had no first-hand memory of 
the 1910-1945 colonial occupation, knew little of their country’s dark past, such as the 
brutalities committed by their imperial army, and were genuinely ignorant of what 
there is to repent (Kristof 1998; Sadada 2006).  
                                                                                                                             
Strait crisis (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003). Japan and the US made the April Clinton-
Hashimoto joint declaration and signed the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996. 
One year later, they eventually agreed and approved the Revised Guidelines for Japan-U.S. 
Defense Cooperation in 1997. However, it is certain that the degree to which Japan relied on 
the US for its security began to decrease to a large extent. 
35 The immense popularity of the two books Blueprint for a New Japan by Ozawa Ichiro and 
The Japan that can say No: The New U.S.-Japan Relations Card by Shintaro Ishihara was 
evidence for growing Japanese nationalism and the influence of neo-conservatism. 
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Moreover, neo-conservatives played a growing role in the decline of the 
conservative LDP, the ruling party since 1955. The conservative LDP lost control of 
the Diet and the government in 1993 mainly because the neo-conservative politicians 
left the LDP, created new parties, and substantially absorbed traditional LDP 
supporters by calling for reform and accusing the LDP of lethargy and corruption. 
Apparently, this collapse did not mean that the Japanese conservatives had lost their 
power to progressive groups; rather, a separation between traditional conservatives 
and neo-conservatives within the LDP occurred.  
Traditionally, Japan’s politics had been divided between right and left. In 
general, leftist groups supported apologizing for war-time aggression and opposed 
Japan’s engagement in international security politics, the amendment of its pacific 
constitution, and the country’s rearmament. The rightist groups, or traditional 
conservatives, generally emphasized economic development under the United States’ 
security umbrella, opposed the leftists’ view, and tended to glorify Japan’s imperialist 
expansion (Berger 1993; Hayes 2005; Shibuichi 2005). In the post-Cold War period, 
however, the progressive groups began to have difficulty holding the right-wing in 
check for two reasons. First, the collapse of the communist bloc reduced the size of 
left-wing’s constituency. Second, the decline of the leading leftist party—the Social 
Democratic Party of Japan—contributed to damaging Japanese confidence in leftist 
groups (Rozman and Lee 2006; Lee 2006). The SDPJ’s strategic choice—forming a 
coalition government with right wing parties including the LDP in 1994—caused a 
terrible backlash. In return for aligning with the LDP, the head of the SDPJ, Tomiichi 
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Murayama, became the prime minister of Japan for a short period. But the SDPJ’s 
strategic choice damaged its leftist party ideology and propaganda lasting for several 
decades and made its traditional constituencies abandon their party. As a consequence, 
the traditional political competition between right and left began to vanish, and the 
new divide between conservatives simultaneously began to emerge and take root in 
Japanese politics (Hayes 2005; Inoguchi 2005; Lee 2006). The rightist groups began to 
attract more attention from the Japanese population.  
These changes unleashed right wing elites (politicians, bureaucrats, and 
professionals) and groups (e.g., Japan War-Bereaved Families Association which 
consists of approximately 10,400,000 households, the Military Pension Federation, the 
Association of Shinto Shrines, and the Japan Conference) to pursue activities aiming 
at resurrecting nationalism. They were bent on establishing a norm calling for a 
“normal/strong” Japan. They wanted Japan to defend its security by itself. This led to a 
nation-wide debate about whether Japan should be a normal state possessing a national 
military, rather than the Self Defense Force (Green 2001; Moon et al 2005). In 
addition, they pushed their government to pass policies aiming at strengthening its 
military capability and to pursue a proactive foreign policy role in international 
politics. In this context, Japan’s Diet passed a bill which allows the Self-Defense Force 
(SDF) to participate in PKO activities, which meant that the bill authorized the first 
Japanese SDF’s military operation overseas since the lost in WWII.36 The Diet also 
officially began to discuss the amendment of its pacific constitution (or at least revise 
                                            
36 The law passed in Japan led to serious concerns not solely in South Korea but also countries 
in Northeast Asia that have bitter memories of Japanese colonialism. (Lee 2006; Moon et al 
2005) 
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Article 937). Consequently, nationalism grew and became a magnet for gathering and 
concentrating right-wing support and much of the population. Nationalist identity 
among Japanese citizens was thus invigorated. 
This period witnessed the rise of a variety of Japanese nationalistic activities. 
Some of these had a potential for making Koreans recall their anti-Japanese identity 
and producing anti-Japanese sentiment. For instance, as a strategy for appealing to 
growing nationalism, Japanese right-wing leaders frequently asserted that the Pacific 
War was not a war of invasion but a benign act to liberate East Asia from Western 
imperialists and preserve common interests in East Asia. Specifically, Prime Minister 
Murayama made a remark before the upper house in 1995 that Japanese annexation of 
Korea was recognized as legitimate within the prevailing international context.38 The 
Minister of the Management and Coordination Agency Eto Takami also publicly 
claimed that Japan did some positive things for Korea during the colonial period.39 
These examples of Japanese nationalism heightened colonial/imperial memories 
among Koreans and became a serious threat to South Korean national identity.  
In South Korea, democratization took place in 1987, resulting in the end of 
authoritarianism. This democratic transition brought fundamental changes in the state-
society relationship, such as liberalization of electoral politics, the emergence of civil 
society, and, as a consequence, the weakening of the power of the government (Kihl 
                                            
37 Article 9 states: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use 
of force as a means of settling international disputes.(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
38 Segye Ilbo, October 11, 1995.   
39 Segye Ilbo, November 9, 1995 
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2005: 238). The collapse of the Cold War undoubtedly contributed to accelerating 
these changes and produced a possibility for the ROK to implement new foreign 
policies and seek more independent security arrangements. This collapse and 
democratization made the main authoritarian ROK’s anti-communism policy practice, 
which consisted of stimulating the fear of another possible North Korean invasion of 
South Korea, seemed less credible and sustainable (Kihl 2005: 241).40  
In response to these shifts, the ROK undertook to revise its foreign policies. 
The Roh Tae Woo administration, inaugurated in 1988, implemented an alternative 
strategy: the so-called “Nordpolitik” which aimed at reducing tension between North 
Korea and South Korea through inter-Korean exchanges and improving relations with 
communist countries such as the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern European states 
(Kihl 2005: 241). Certainly, the ROK’s confidence, stemming from its rapid economic 
growth and development, greatly contributed to its decision to change its foreign 
policy direction. As a consequence of the ROK’s Nordpolitik, South Korea normalized 
its political relationship with Beijing and Moscow as well as its economic ties with 
China and Russia. In addition, intermittently inter-Korean exchanges began. Moreover, 
these dynamics resulted in the reduction of the Koreans’ support for the US-ROK 
alliance to some degree, as the alliance had been an outcome of the security 
competition against the communist bloc. South Korea’s need for economic and 
political support from Japan began to decrease. 
                                            
40 Authoritarian regimes in South Korea used a so-called “diversionary theory.” The theory 
states that domestic circumstances motivate the ruling elites to divert a population's attention 
from domestic to international problems by pursuing an international conflict. See Oneal et al 
(2006) for details of the theory.  
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With these shifts in domestic and international environments, Korean civil 
society became an important political actor.41 Democratization, in particular, had a 
great impact as it allowed citizens the freedom to discuss formerly suppressed or 
censured issues (Calder 2004). Civil society played a great role in reopening past, 
unresolved colonial issues, as well as founding numerous civic organizations to 
confront these issues. As a result, Korean nationalism,42 whose core vision had been a 
nation independent from Japanese and communist threats since the emergence of the 
ROK, flourished. Koreans’ anti-Japanese sentiment was also stimulated in this process 
and became more prominent. Domestic politics consequently became an increasingly 
important factor in Korean policymaking toward Japan.  
As South Korea became a democracy and as the communist bloc collapsed, 
numerous civic organizations (e.g., Association for the Pacific War Victims, Korea 
Chongshindae's Institute,43 the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military 
Sexual Slavery by Japan) emerged to confront unresolved past colonial problems in 
South Korea. Civil organizations and groups of war victims, such as the Association of 
Pacific War Victims, Bereaved Families of Koreans and Citizens’ Coalition for 
Economic Justice, demanded their government play an active role in resolving the 
                                            
41 According to Kihl (2005: 238-239), “Although the role of public opinion and interest 
groups in foreign policy making has traditionally not been strong in Korean civil society, this 
is rapidly changing with the process of democratic consolidation. The greater input and 
changing roles of the interest groups in Korea’s nascent civil society, for instance, are 
underscored by an active role of such civil role of such civil-society groups as business 
organizations, labor unions, church groups, intellectuals, student organization and civic 
organizations.” 
42 See Lee (1985) for further information.  
43 Chongshindae is a Korean term for the women drafted for military sexual slavery by Japan 
during the Japanese colonial period. 
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issues. These groups served as norm entrepreneurs44 to promote a norm for settling 
colonial issues while focusing on disseminating information on such issues, urging the 
ROK government to liquidate the legacies of Japanese imperialism, protesting against 
"insensitive" Japanese remarks or gestures, and disputing such issues in public. These 
norm entrepreneurs could persuade Koreans to follow the norm of the resolution of the 
colonial past issues because, in the eyes of Koreans, Japan had not taken sufficient 
steps to deal with these issues and the ROK government had not adequately liquidated 
pro-Japanese legacies. The actions of the norm entrepreneurs had an impact not only 
on older generations of Koreans which still had difficulty coming to terms with the 
memory of their colonial past, but also on younger generations who had never 
experienced the colonial period but had learned the bitter history of colonialism 
though formal history education and mass media. Past colonial issues began to receive 
greater and greater attention from the Korean publics.  
For instance,45 in May 1990 the Association for the Pacific War Victims and 
other groups demanded the governments of both Japan and the ROK to disclose the 
lists of names of war victims, and held sixteen days of nation-wide demonstrations to 
call for a resolution, which caused the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to halt its operations 
                                            
44 For constructivists such as Finnnmore and Sikkink, norms “are built by agents having strong 
notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community…..Norm entrepreneurs are 
critical for norm emergence because the call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using 
language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them…. The construction of cognitive frames 
is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs’ political strategies, since, when they are 
successful, the new frames resonate with broader public understanding and are adopted a new 
ways of talking about and understanding issues” (Finnmore et al 1998: 896-897). 
45 Available at the homepage of Association for the Pacific War Victims (www.victims.co.kr) 
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for three days. As a consequence of these actions, during a visit to Japan on May 24, 
the South Korean President submitted a “request to disclose the names of relocated 
Koreans” to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the first time in the 45 
years—since the end of the Pacific war. Lists containing 90,804 names were returned 
to the South Korean government in January 1991. 
As seen in this example, past colonial issues became an important issue on the 
agenda of South Korea’s domestic politics. Simultaneously, South Korean nationalism 
grew. The desire to resolve wartime issues and liquidate the legacies of the colonial 
experience began to be pervasive. It became difficult for the ROK democratic 
government, which found its legitimacy in the public’s support for its efforts, to 
disregard these norms.  
In the meantime, a leader of the 1987 democratization movement, Kim 
Young-Sam, became President in 1993. The Kim administration called for a national 
campaign to correct historical distortions, including publicizing the misdeeds of the 
South Korea’s authoritarian regimes and of the occupation regime (Moon et al. 2005). 
One of the central subjects of this campaign was to remove vestiges of the Japanese 
imperialism and liquidate past colonial legacies. This act was responsive to what most 
of the Korean population wanted. This was evidence for growing nationalism, as well 
as the impact of the norm on the politics of South Korea. 
The Kim administration laid out and initiated a serious of plans for the 
campaign. It embarked on restoring the palace of the Chosun Dynasty and demolished 
the building used by the Japanese governor-general during the colonial period, a 
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building symbolizing the Japanese occupation. In addition, the government pushed 
hard on such issues as accountability, compensation for comfort women, and apologies 
for the Pacific war (Moon et al. 2005: 566). During this period, Korean anti-Japanese 
nationalist identity was stimulated by its own government and the NGOs. It goes 
without saying that growing Japanese nationalism led Koreans to recall their anti-
Japanese identity and provided growing anti-Japanese sentiment, resulting in turn in 
the rise of Korean nationalism.   
Thus, with the shifts in domestic and international environments, the recurrent 
emergence of past colonial issues pushed the two countries into conflicts of anti-
Japanese identity among Koreans and nationalist identity among the Japanese. This 
resulted in a failure to overcome the essential cognitive baseline of their interactions—
enmity. 
Meanwhile, the Tokto territorial issue emerged between Japan and South 
Korea. The ROK government essentially had two purposes in constructing a wharf on 
Tokto. The first was related to the issue of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The 
United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1983 included a 200 
nautical-mile EEZ. This law went into effect in 1994. However, neither South Korea 
nor Japan did ratify the UNCLOS. This was because the East Sea is not wide enough 
to provide the both parties with the 200 nautical-mile EEZ. As the law entered into 
force, they could not delay ratifying the UNCLOS any longer and had to negotiate 
about a base point for EEZ delimitation. As a result, the Kim government decided to 
construct the wharf facilities to consolidate further its sovereignty over Tokto and to 
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provide bargaining leverage upcoming EEZ negotiation.46  
The second purpose was to demonstrate to its public that the government was 
firmly preparing for any possible Japanese provocation by acting preemptively. The 
ROK was faced growing nationalism. It had also been provoked by improper 
comments from Japan on the colonial history and on Tokto. Thus failing to take 
preemptive actions was difficult for the democratic government, which was well 
aware that Tokto would become a focus of diplomatic trouble between Japan and the 
ROK. It feared that Japanese provocations regarding Tokto’s ownership would pose a 
serious threat to South Korean national identity and, accordingly, would cause a 
decline of the President’s party in the general election in April, 1996 (Choi 2005: 473).  
In response to the ROK’s wharf construction plan, the Hashimoto government 
publicly declared that the Tokto was its territory and was illegally occupied by the 
ROK. Japan’s claim on sovereignty over Tokto was intolerable for the ROK because 
its claim stemmed from the assertion that the Korean government (the Chosen 
Dynasty) and the Japanese government had legitimately made the Protectorate Treaty 
of 1905 and the Japanese Annexation of Korea Treaty in 1910. This claim agitated 
Koreans and exacerbated their anti-Japanese sentiment. Various civil groups led to the 
so-called “Tokto movement.” In response to its people’s anger and protests, as well as 
its own interests, the ROK government carried out a set of strong countermeasures.  
Consequently, during this post-Cold War period, nationalism in the two Asian 
                                            
46 However, EEZ boundary negotiations have not finished as of 2007. Currently Tokdo is 
included in the ROK-Japan joint fisheries zone, but the 12 nautical miles that demarcate 
territorial waters surrounding Tokdo have been steadfastly upheld by the ROK 
(www.Koreat.net May 12, 2006) 
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states grew dramatically. The rise of Japanese nationalism, which enhanced a sense of 
superiority toward its former colonial subjects, contributed to South Koreans' 
perception of Japan as a potential threat, not a partner. Korea’s anti-Japanese identity 
was also reinforced in response to growing Japanese nationalism. The sensitive 
reactions of the ROK to Japanese domestic politics contributed to growing nationalism 
in Japan and encouraged Japan to perceive South Korea as an unfriendly neighbor. As 
a result, the ROK and Japan was unable to overcome their enmity. This was reflected 
in public opinion polls. For instance, in a poll conducted in 1993, Japanese ranked 
South Korea third on the list of the most-disliked nations, behind Russia and North 
Korea, while South Koreans ranked Japan second on the list, after North Korea (Shuja 
1996). The Tokto territorial dispute eventually erupted in the midst of the nationalist 
identity conflicts between them. This issue served as a tipping point in their relations, 
turned highly conflictive and hostile. Consonant with Putnam’s “two-level games” 
(1988) ,47 the Japanese government faced with pressure from its public strongly 
protested against the ROK’s Tokto Wharf construction plan and, by the same logic, the 
South Korean government took strong measures in response to this territorial issue. In 
addition, as their nationalist identity was strengthened during this dispute, the two 
countries were averse to offering positive policy initiatives toward each other. In this 
                                            
47 According to Robert Putnam (1988: 434), “The politics of many international negotiations 
can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue 
their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek 
power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can 
be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet 
sovereign.” The level Ⅰ game refers to the international level game, whereas the level Ⅱ 
game refers to the national level game.  
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context, Japan-ROK relations were rapidly chilled and a series of serious diplomatic 
disputes erupted. 
However, their conflictive relations did not last long. Their relations became 
cooperative in the wake of the ROK’s IMF crisis and the North Korean Taepo-Dong 
missile crisis. A selective combination of different IR perspectives helps shed light on 
how South Korea and Japan could be cooperative and improve their contentious 
relations.  
A Combination of Liberalism and Constructivism and A Combination of 
Realism and Constructivism 
If we combine the insights of liberal interdependence and those of 
constructivism into collective identities, we can formulate a critical theoretical 
framework for their bilateral behavior in the face of the IMF crisis. A framework 
would be as follows: Japan and the ROK had constructed a collective identity through 
economic interaction. This identity had been another primary baseline of Japan-ROK 
interactions. In the face of the ROK’s economic crisis, a high level of economic 
interdependence between them became the priority issue for Japan-ROK relations. As 
liberals (e.g., Keohane and Nye 1977; Koehane 1984; Russet and Oneal 2003) suggest, 
the reality that economic cooperation was an imperative emerged immediately after 
the ROK’s economic crisis because the collapse of the ROK economy was directly or 
indirectly a serious threat to Japan’s economy given their economies' interdependence.  
Faced with the ROK’s economic crisis, Japan and the ROK shared the 
economic cooperation imperative and realized that they were economically 
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interdependent and needed to remain economic partners (Moon et. al 2005). The two 
governments played a primary role in reminding their publics of their shared identity 
of economic partnership. As Keohane (1984: 243) suggests, it was natural that the two 
governments’ policies must be adjusted to one another because frictions between the 
two interdependent states had been severe and the economic cooperation imperative 
emerged immediately after the ROK’s economic crisis. This resulted in recalling and 
intensifying their shared identity of economic partnership guiding both Koreans and 
Japanese to understand that reciprocal economic relations between the two countries 
should develop in accordance with economic rather than political logic and that 
economic cooperation should not be a prey for political conflicts derived from the 
historical and territorial issues.48 In this context, faced with the need for cooperation, 
Japan and South Korea could assist each other. Thus, they moved to cooperate in the 
wake of South Korea’s financial crisis. 
Difficulty in Ignoring the Need for Cooperation: In November 1997, the 
financial and foreign exchange crisis began, even as South Korea was enjoying world-
wide recognition as a newly industrialized country as well as a leading developing 
country.49 For Korean society, the crisis was viewed as an event that could reduce 
national pride and harm the economy overnight. In response to the economic crisis, 
and apart from seeking help from the IMF’s bail out program, the Kim government 
decided to ask its economic partner, Japan, for economic assistance. At that time, the 
ROK was Japan’s second leading trading partner in Asia which was, in turn, ROK’s 
                                            
48 Washington Post, May 18, 2001 
49 It actually occurred just a year after the ROK celebrated its entry into the club of the world’s 
developed countries, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
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largest trading partner in the region (Moon et. al 2005). Both practiced state-guided 
industrialization and export-oriented strategies.  
Simultaneously, the South Korean government emphasized its economic 
interdependence with Japan and the complementary nature of the two economies 
(Moon et al 2005).50 President Kim also publicized that South Korea wished to 
establish a cooperative relationship with Japan, not only to overcome the economic 
crisis, but also to achieve the North-South relationship development through the 
Sunshine policy, which sought to “lead North Korea down a path toward peace, reform, 
and openness through reconciliation, interaction, and cooperation with the South” 
(Kihl 2005: 249).51  
In addition, the Korean government called for dealing with past colonial and 
territorial issues separately from economic issues. It called on its population to 
advance toward a new era which would not be captive of its colonial past and would 
be capable of consolidating a cooperative relationship with Japan.52 It initiated several 
conciliatory gestures and focused on creating a new momentum for ending the vicious 
circle of mutual distrust. At the same time, it was careful about commenting on the 
colonial issues or provoking anti-Japanese sentiment. To the extent to which anti-
Japanese sentiment in the Korean society had been pervasive, a colonial past issue 
could be sufficient to end the momentum for developing a cooperative relationship 
with Japan. Therefore, the government had to avoid expressing sympathy for civil 
                                            
50 The Kim government expected the positive effect of the shared values on the ROK-Japanese 
relations since uniting people with one another is a major shared value.  
51 Korea Herald, October 2, 1998.  
52 This idea was not new. As already discussed, every administration in both countries 
suggested this idea when it was inaugurated.  
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organizations’ demands for resolving the pending issues and so awakening Korean 
anti-Japanese identity (Choi 2005).  
Despite the government’s efforts, much of the population was skeptical and 
indifferent about paving the way for cooperation with Japan. This was because they 
believed that seeking Japanese economic wounded its national pride. Also, South 
Koreans had been unsettled by the Japanese politicians’ remarks on colonial history 
and Tokto sovereignty claims, as well as the Japanese government’s lukewarm action 
on compensation and apology regarding the comfort-women issue.  
However, as the perspective of a combination of liberalism and constructivism 
suggests, South Koreans had identified Japan as their economic and security partner to 
a large degree, independent of their anti-Japanese identity. The ROK governmental 
efforts, however, inspired its people’s economic-partnership identity with Japan, and 
they began to perceive that political conflicts derived from the historical and territorial 
issues should not harm the economic cooperation between the ROK and Japan (Moon 
et al. 2005) and that the issues should be handled independently. During this time, 
Japan extended $10 billion through the IMF rescue package, rolled short-term loans 
over long-term ones, and invested $1.75 billion through foreign direct investment in 
the ROK in 1998 (Kim 2006). Japanese economic assistance contributed to reducing 
Koreans’ anti-Japanese sentiment and identity to some degree (Rozman and Lee 2006: 
765). With the effect of the economic-partnership identity derived from the economic 
interdependence and interactions, South Korea could further deepen the cooperative 
relationship with Japan by actions such as enhancing cultural exchanges and removing 
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a ban on Japanese pop culture.  
In return, Japan positively reacted to the ROK’s pro-Japanese initiatives and 
offered economic assistance to overcome the financial crisis to its decades-old 
economic and security partner. At that time, Japan was seeking to gain political 
influence be fitting its international status as the world’s second largest economy 
through its economic aid policies to the world (Rozman 1999). As part of this strategy, 
it had pursued the Asia-first policy, especially multilateral-oriented economic policies. 
Suddenly, the economy of South Korea, Japan’s second largest economic collaborator 
in the region, began a melt down after the Asian economic crisis which had began with 
the Thai Baht exchange crisis. In the face of the South Korean IMF crisis, the Japanese 
government, which had a major interest in defending the Asian model of economic 
development against the US-led IMF bailout operation,53 had great sympathy for the 
ROK government. South Korea had maintained a high level of economic cooperation 
with Japan, had followed the Asian model of economic development based on state-
guided industrialization and exports-oriented strategies, and had been an important 
strategic partner in coping with North Korean threats (Moon et al. 2005; Lee 2006). 
The Japanese government was also concerned that since the two economies were 
linked, the 1997 South Korean economic crisis would be an obstacle to its efforts to 
                                            
53 At that time Japan initially welcomed the IMF bailout program to overcome Asian 
countries’ financial crisis, but rejected the IMF’s loan program as the financial crisis became 
pervasive throughout Asia. It became accepted that Asian-Miracle, or Asian-Style Economic 
Model, ended (Lee 2006). For this reason, Japan undertook a bolder regional economic 
initiative by offering a great amount of economic assistance to the crisis-suffering Asian 
countries and proposing the creation of the Asian Monetary Fund (Lee 2006; Moon et al. 
2005; Ketzenstein et al 2003). It also hoped to create a yen bloc in Asia (Heginbotham et al. 
1998). 
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overcome its own economic recession, which had persisted almost for a decade. 
Therefore, the Japanese government provided a significant amount of economic-
rescue loans to South Korea. According to one survey, 78 percent of Japanese 
respondents supported its government's decision to assist the ROK.54 Consequently, 
Japan’s motivation for establishing a cooperative relationship with South Korea 
increased in the face of the South Korean financial crisis.  
Burgeoning cooperation between Japan and South Korea accelerated, as on 
September 1st, 1998, North Korea suddenly fired a Taepo-Dong 1 missile into the 
Northern Pacific which was believed to have a range of 1,700 to 2,200km and so was 
able to strike most cities in Japan.55 Resulting their cooperation reflected a 
combination of realist balancing and constructivist insights. The missile issue certainly 
posed a threat to Japan and the ROK and became a salient issue for the two. As a result, 
their anti-communist identity was revived and strengthened by the security imperative 
faced by the two countries. Japan and the ROK wasted no time in responding North 
Korea’s provocative action, which reflects Walt’s balance of threats. The collective 
identity served as a rationale for cooperative exchanges between the two states. Japan 
and the ROK could shape mutual interests to manage this threatening issue and drop 
other conflictive issues, therefore augmenting their cooperation.  
Prior to the test, Japan had been enthusiastically bent on transforming and 
improving its post-Cold War relationship with North Korea. During the Cold War 
period, Japan had had little interest in a normal relationship with North Korea. In turn, 
                                            
54 Korea Times October 11, 1998. 
55 Korea Herald, September 3, 1998. 
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North Korea also had had no significant strategic or ideological reason to interact with 
Japan since it had allied to the Soviet Union and China and had received ample 
assistance from each. However, with the end of the Cold War, both of them were 
aware of the impracticality of continuing Cold War policies toward each other. From 
the early post-Cold War period, Japan began to seek greater influence on the Korean 
peninsula vis-à-vis Asian competitors such as China and Russia (Fouse 2004).  
As the USSR and the ROK sought to normalize their relationship, Japan 
contemplated a normalization treaty with North Korea. In September 1990, a Japanese 
joint LDP-JSP (Liberal Democratic Party and Japan Socialist Party) delegation led by 
Kanemaru Shin, a vice president of the LDP, visited Pyongyang to seek to normalize 
Japan’s relationship with the North. This occurred just in two weeks after South 
Korean President Roh Tae-Woo had met with Mikhail Gorbachev in San Francisco. 
After the Japan-North Korea talks, Tokyo and Pyongyang held eight rounds of 
normalization talks until November 1992. However, the Kanemaru Shin-led 
normalization efforts came to naught owing to the disputes within factions of LDP, 
oppositions by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shin’s corruption scandal, 
and objection by United States and South Korea56 (Toshimirau 2000; Bell 2005). After 
this failure, Japan and North Korea had barely had diplomatic exchanges. Nor had 
they made efforts to resume normalizations talks.  
In 1993, the first North Korean nuclear crisis erupted. Japan sought to 
                                            
56 Seoul was seriously concerned that the large amount of reparations Shin promised would 
impinge on its own policy toward North Korea. Washington was also concerned that the 
financial aid might be used for nuclear development programs and requested that inspection of 
North Korean nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be 
a precondition in further normalization talks between Tokyo and Pyongyang (Fouse 2004). 
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transform North Korea’s nuclear facilities to peaceful power facilities through a 
coordinated policy with the US and the ROK. It supported the US-ROK-led 
engagement policy toward North Korea, which encouraged opening and spurring 
economic growth and development in North Korea which would lead to change (Cha 
et al 2003: 15-16). It promised to provide $10 billion for the KEDO projects, which 
was the second largest contribution to the KEDO after the ROK, and humanitarian and 
economic assistance to North Korea.  
Simultaneously, Japan was independently determined to achieve a normalized 
relationship with North Korea by restarting normalization talks.57 As it had not played 
a critical role in resolving the nuclear standoff, Japan was concerned about being left 
behind Washington and Seoul in establishing a diplomatic relationship with 
Pyongyang, as well as losing influence over Pyongyang (Kim et al. 2000: 601; Kang 
and Kaseda 2001: 54). In addition, despite the peaceful resolution of the first North 
Korean nuclear issue, Japan was seriously worried about North Korean possession of 
weapons of mass destruction, such as mid-range missiles and biochemical weapons. 
This was reflected in the fact that Japan’s 1997 edition of White Paper on Defense still 
described North Korea as the “major destabilizing factor” in East Asian Security.58 
Accordingly, Japan took various steps to normalize with North Korea. Conditions 
were unfavorable however, and normalization talks between Japan and North Korea 
were continuously been stalled owing to the kidnapping of Japanese nationals during 
                                            
57 Japanese lawmakers from ruling coalition parties visited Pyongyang on March 28, 1995 and 
signed with North Korean Labor Party members to reopen normalization talks without any 
preconditions (Fouse 2004). After that, Japan and North Korea continued the talks up to the 
missile launch.   
58 Quoted in Kim (2006)  
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the Cold War period (Manyin 2003: 2).59
In the meanwhile, in September, 1998, North Korea suddenly conducted the 
Taepo-Dong 1 missile test-fire. The missile flew over Japan’s territory, but Tokyo was 
completely unaware of the missile firing. Even after the U.S. military informed it of 
the launch, Japan could not point out where the missile landed, exposing the 
inadequacy of its missile detecting capability.60 Japan was shocked and humiliated by 
the fact that North Korea had built a substantial projection capability for weapons of 
mass destruction. As a result, this missile test firing exacerbated Japan’s fear about the 
North Korean threat. Japanese anti-North Korean sentiment and identities intensified 
significantly.  
Faced with growing anti-North Korean sentiment among its people, the 
Japanese government wasted no time in following realist reasoning that would require 
Japan not only to increase its power, but also to work with its security provider, the US, 
and its long-time strategic partner, the ROK with which it shared the threat and an 
anti-communist identity, in a bid to balance North Korea.61 It promptly halted its food 
aid to North Korea, froze the $1 billion which provided under Geneva agreement to 
construct light-water reactors for North Korea, and suspended all negotiations with 
North Korea on normalizing their diplomatic relationship. Japan also embarked on 
                                            
59 It was argued that North Korean agents kidnapped many Japanese. In fact, in 2002, the 
North acknowledged that its agents kidnapped 13 Japanese nationals, and that among 13 
abducted Japanese, eight were dead and five were alive. Later, North Korea repatriated the 
five to Japan and sent the bones of a dead Japanese female to her mother country. 
60 Korea Herald, September 3, 1998.  
61 http://news.hankooki.com, August 9, 1998. Japan had not increased its defense budget for 
the previous three years. In 1999, the ministry of foreign affairs announced that Japan 
increased defense budget by 1.6 percent in the response to the North Korean missile test firing. 
It allotted 29.7 billion yen for anti-missile defense system.  
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increasing consultations with United States and South Korea to respond to the missile 
launch and prevent North Korea from further developing long-range missiles. 
Consequently, the missile launch greatly augmented Japan’s motivation for working 
with South Korea.  
On the South Korean side, the missile test also contributed to promptly 
offering cooperative measures to Japan. At that time, the ROK was pursuing its liberal 
engagement policy toward North Korea, the so-called Sunshine policy. However, the 
ROK’s engagement initiative had not been due to a tangible reduction in North Korean 
military threats. South Korea still listed North Korea as its “main enemy” in its White 
Paper on Defense in 1997. Instead, the Sunshine policy was pursued because the ROK 
hoped to prevent the worst-case scenario of unification through the engagement 
measures. South Korea recognized that in the 1990s, North Korea had persistently 
faced desperate economic crises and no longer received foreign aid from the 
communist bloc, a situation which caused the deaths of approximately one million 
people. In this sense, South Korea had seriously been concerned about the 
continuation of North Korea’s economic crisis and thus had begun to take steps to 
prevent the case of a sudden collapse of North Korea. Such a collapse would impose 
catastrophic socio-economic costs on the ROK itself, far worse than that faced by 
Germany after its unification. Based on this rationale, the ROK had pursued a soft-
landing-driven engagement policy toward North Korea (Kihl 2005).  
In the meantime, the missile launch took place. Undoubtedly, the missile 
launch served as an immediate threat to South Korea. This recalled South Koreans’ 
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anti-communist identity, which consequently caused the re-emergence of anti-North 
Korean sentiment. As a result, Seoul again sought greater efforts with its security 
partners, including Japan, to deal with this provocative action.  
Faced with anti-North Korean public sentiment, South Korea warned that 
Pyongyang would face economic and political penalties, including the suspension of 
food aid if it continued to conduct missile test firings62 ROK Defense Minister, Chun 
Yong-Tak, flew to Tokyo one day after the test to meet with Japanese Defense 
Minister Fukushiro Nukaga to discuss the missile firing and joint defense against a 
potential North Korean missile attack.63 The two ministers agreed that the North's 
missile launch posed a grave threat to the security and peace to the Korean peninsula, 
but to the entire region. They also agreed that as the first visible result of their closer 
cooperation, the two countries would hold a director-level meeting devoted to 
consulting and coordinating a joint posture in dealing with the North's missile 
program.64 Moreover, lawmakers from both countries joined forces to urge North 
Korea to stop developing, launching, and exporting missiles.  
The two governments significantly increased consultations and collaboration. 
They were intent on establishing a united front against another possible missile launch 
and making policy coordination, while stepping up firm military preparations. 
Trilateral cooperation was also increased. Although the Japanese government had 
initially implemented hard-line measures immediately after the missile launch, it had 
to ease its hard-line policy and pursue a coordinated measure with its partners because 
                                            
62 CNN.com. September 2, 1998.  
63 Korea Herald, September 2, 1998. 
64 Korea Times, September 2, 1998.  
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it deemed it too risky to carry on a unilateral realist balancing policy. Japan retracted 
the suspension of its commitment to the KEDO on October 21, 1998, and again Japan 
sought to engage North Korea. Therefore, the United States, Japan, and South Korea 
built the trilateral coordination and oversight group (TCOG) to coordinate policy 
toward North Korea. Also, in the face of the North Korean missile test, Japan and the 
ROK embarked on pursuing extensive security cooperation with each other, as would 
be expected from the mixture of the realist and constructivist elements.  
As a result of these two events, the two Asian countries were more actively 
motivated to cooperate, resulting in the signing of the Japan-ROK Partnership for the 
21st century. This joint declaration suggested that Japan and South Korea were 
dramatically improving relations. Japan and South Korea began to pursue cooperative 
policies and implement confidence-building measures toward each other.  
To sum up, such Japan-South Koran relations in this period afford a typical 
case for a pluralist approach. Nationalist identity conflicts between Japan and South 
Korea were a primary factor in their deteriorating relations. It was difficult for the two 
countries to cooperate with each other in the midst of the ideational conflicts. Yet, the 
financial crisis and the North Korean missile launch dampened conflictive identities in 
their relations. Their conflictive relations turned cooperative during this period. Their 
cooperative relations reflected a combination of liberal interdependence and 
constructivist insights on norms and identities and that of realist balancing and 
constructivist insights. 
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Japan-ROK Relations 2001 To 2005 
Their Volatile Relations 
In the two and a half years after 1998, the relationship between Korea and 
Japan flourished as in ever before. Unfortunately, this cooperative relationship did not 
last long. It ended on April 10, 2001, as the ROK recalled its ambassador to Tokyo to 
protest the Japanese government's approval of middle school textbooks, which were 
written by a right-wing intellectual group—the Society for Making New History 
Books,65 that seemed to whitewash Japan's wartime atrocities. However, the ROK and 
Japanese governments made efforts to improve their deteriorating relationship. The 
two governments held bilateral summit talks, six months after the event. They agreed 
to launch working-level negotiations to resolve the issue of alleged historical 
distortions in Japanese textbooks as well as other issues, including preparation for the 
2002 World Cup which they were to co-host. The ROK government resumed military 
exchanges and market openings to Japanese culture and arts products, which had been 
suspended in July in protest Tokyo's refusal to revise the controversial history 
textbooks. In addition, faced with a second nuclear crisis,66 Japan and the ROK agreed 
to pursue cooperation on a wide range of issues, including diplomatic collaboration on 
the North Korean issue, joint historical research, and counterterrorism (Kim 2006: 
                                            
65 The Korean government officially requested that history books be revised with the removal 
of 35 items including the beautification of Japan’s occupation over Korea, the omission of any 
word regarding comfort women, the description of Korea as a tributary state under China’s 
control, and misinterpretation of ancient Korean history with Japanese influence. However, the 
Japanese government rejected the ROK government’s demand.  
66 On October 16th, 2002, a US Senior official announced that Kang Suk-Ju, vice minister of 
Foreign Affairs in North Korea, admitted that the North Korea had a HEU (highly enriched 
uranium) program, which assured in the second North Korean nuclear crisis. 
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196).  
Such Japan-ROK relations were consequently cooperative and amicable in 
this period. Their cooperative relationship was reflected in the speech of ROK 
president Roh on June 10, 2003 during a four-day state visit to Japan in which he told 
Japan's Lower House that the ROK, the United States, and Japan must continue close 
coordination and cooperation for the sake of regional security and added that he shared 
Japanese concerns about the North's nuclear and missile threats.67 He continued “I am 
confident that an era of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia is the common future 
of South Korea and Japan and the leaders of the two countries should tell this to the 
people.”  
Nevertheless, only two years later Japan-ROK relations deteriorated 
precipitously. In late February 2005, the inflammatory territorial Tokto issue 
associated with Japan’s legal action re-emerged. Japan’s Shimane Prefecture Council 
put forward to the legislature a bill that designated February 22 as “Takeshima Day.” 
On the same day, the Japanese ambassador to the ROK, Toshiyuki Takano, publicly 
proclaimed his country’s ownership of Tokto. Furthermore, the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry stated that “Takeshima is historically and legally part of the Japanese 
territory” and accused the ROK of “illegally occupying” Tokto.68
The ROK government immediately urged the Japanese central government to 
force the Shimane Prefecture government to withdraw the bill, since it had not yet 
been passed. The Koizumi government did not respond. This led President Roh to 
                                            
67 www.kois.go.kr. 
68 Korea Herald, Feb 26, 2005.  
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adopt a still more rigorous approach. In a speech marking the 86th anniversary of the 
March 1 Independence Movement of 1919, Roh announced that Japan should 
apologize and compensate for its wrongdoings in the past, and promised that his 
administration would step up efforts to resolve the issue of individual victims` claims 
to seek indemnity from Japan.69  
Despite the ROK’s strong reactions, Japan’s Shimane Prefecture Council 
passed the bill on March 16 without intervention from the central government. In 
addition, prior to the passage of the “Takeshima Day” bill, Koreans were informed that 
Japan’s Ministry of Education planned to approve more history books which 
whitewashed its wartime atrocities and contained Japan’s claim to ownership of Tokto. 
Eventually, the ROK president announced, “No matter what difficulties I may face, I 
will not back off or obscure the issue, but will continue to deal with the problem until I 
see a result the Korean people find acceptable.”70 He also declared “a diplomatic war 
against Japan.”71 Despite the ROK’s harsh reactions to Japan’s nationalist activities, 
Japan’s Ministry of Education approved the history books. The Japanese government 
responded to the ROK’s opposition by claiming private publications were beyond 
government control. 
In the process of confronting Japan’s unrepentant and provocative activities, 
                                            
69 www.Korea.net., March 2, 2005.,  
70 Korea Herald, March 14, 2005.  
71 www.Korea.net, March 23, 2005. Regarding the Roh’s stern remarks, some argued that the 
purpose of these remarks was to gain political support by appealing the ROK’s nationalism 
and that this strategy caused a conflictive relationship with Japan (Rozman and Lee 2006). 
Certainly their argument is legitimate in that his remarks triggered the conflictive relations. 
However, this argument is not able to explain the continuity of the conflictive relationship 
between Japan and South Korea throughout the post-Cold War period. 
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the ROK government canceled shuttle diplomacy between heads of the two countries. 
In December, the ROK president Roh and Chinese President Hu Jintao refused to hold 
an annual meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi at the ASEAN Plus 3 
Summit. Moreover, South Korea aligned with China to oppose the Japanese bid to 
attain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.72 They publicly denounced 
Japan’s behavior and eventually succeeded in thwarting Japan’s efforts to gain a 
permanent seat on the Council. 
 Thus, Japan-ROK relations were unusually volatile during this period. A 
pluralist view helps to explain this.  
 
Pluralist Explanation 
 The theoretical arguments for the volatile relations of South Korea and Japan 
during this period resemble those discussed in the previous volatility section, as the 
cyclical periods of friction followed by crises leading to cooperation. To explain 
conflictive Japan-ROK relations, this study uses constructivism. To account for their 
cooperative relations, it selectively combines insights from constructivist and 
rationalist theories.  
Constructivist Account 
Japan-ROK relations during this period combined cooperation and conflict in 
unexpected ways that cannot be accounted for either by realist or by liberal theory. Of 
                                            
72 Of course, since Japan strengthened its military activities by, for instance, dispatching naval 
forces to support the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan, launching reconnaissance 
satellites over North Korea, and increasing military budgets for obtaining missile defenses, 
they also motivated South Korea and Japan to work together (Kim 2006).   
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course, constructivism cannot account entirely for their cooperative relations either. 
However, constructivism can account adequately for their conflictive relations during 
this period, because their diplomatic row was a consequence of the interaction 
between the growing nationalism in Japan and its by-products (e.g., nationalist 
activities regarding colonial history) and the growing nationalism in South Korea and 
its by-products (e.g., strong reaction to Japanese national issues and calls for the 
resolution of past colonial issues and the liquidation of Japanese colonial legacies).  
The Continuation of Nationalist Identity Conflicts and the Nadir of Their 
Relations: Nationalism continuously grew both in Japan and South Korea during the 
period of cooperation between Japan and the ROK beginning at 1998 (Kim 2006: 162; 
Hundt and Bleik 2007). In addition, there had been no substantial efforts to settle 
colonial past issues, although it had been expected among Koreans that Japan would 
take accountable and constructive steps for resolving the thorny issues. South 
Koreans’ anti-Japanese identity had never completely disappeared during this 
period;73 rather, it had been latent and nested. Certainly the norm of the resolution of 
the pending issues and colonial legacies also had not disappeared because the issues 
had not yet been settled. Instead, this norm had grown but was briefly less salient in 
Koreans’ perceptions than the norm of the 21st century partnership. Likewise, in Japan 
perhaps the norm of the 21st century partnership emerged. But it failed to become 
sufficiently influential to reverse Japan's tilt toward the right. Japan’s politicians and 
                                            
73 For instance, the ROK was reluctant to approve a FDI (foreign direct investment) treaty 
with Japan partially because the Kim Dae Jung government “was concerned about domestic 
political backlash that would arise from the support of Japan-centered regional bloc. South 
Koreans are still bitter about Japanese colonial domination.” (Moon et al 2005: 587) 
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right-wing sometimes reacted instead to growing domestic nationalism. For instance, 
the House of Representatives of Japan passed a controversial bill reinstating the 
Hinomaru (the sun flag) and Kimikayo (a hymn glorifying the emperor) as the official 
national flag and the national anthem, both symbols of Japanese imperialism.74  
While nationalism was growing in both countries, the Japanese government 
approved the history books written by a right-wing intellectual group in the spring of 
2001. The reason for the Japanese government’s lack of action in disapproving the 
books, which held the potential for provoking a significant backlash in neighboring 
countries, reflects the fact that Japan was moving politically rightwards (Sasada 2004; 
Lee 2006). 
 The approval of the history textbooks which glorified Japan’s modern history 
and whitewashed wrongdoings in the period of imperialism shocked Koreans who 
were concerned about the possible reappearance of Japanese nationalism and 
militarism. Japan’s approval of the texts thus stimulated dormant South Koreans’ anti-
Japanese identity (Moon et al 2005: 594). This stoked Koreans’ anti-Japanese national 
identity and shaped anti-Japanese attitudes and behavior. The norm of resolving past 
colonial issues again became pervasive on the cognitive image of the Korean public. 
In addition, the ROK’s concerns about the Japanese right-wing movement and 
nationalism dramatically increased. In this context, the ROK democratic government 
issued protests, including the recall of its ambassador in Japan, and civil groups 
launched a nationwide campaign to boycott Japanese goods to protest Tokyo's 
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authorization of “biased” history textbooks. In addition, this textbook issue led 
politicians and civil groups to call for the cancellation of the 1998 summit agreement 
between the two countries regarding a new partnership for the 21st century.75
Korean-Japanese relations further deteriorated as Japanese Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi, who voiced the need to revise Japan's "peace constitution," visited 
to the Yasukuni Shrine in August 2001, at which fourteen class A war criminals and 
the 2.5 million casualties of WWII were enshrined. His “unofficial” visit to the Shrine 
was viewed as representing the rise of nationalism and militarism (Shibuichi 2005: 
203) and in accord with the growing sense of nationalism in Japan (Kim 2006: 190). 
His visit added fuel to anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans. Such sentiment 
challenged Korean national identity. In response, the ROK made strong protests, 
including diplomatic initiatives and rallies by civic groups. South Korea continued 
suspending security cooperation and putting off the market opening for Japanese 
cultural items which had been delayed immediately after the Japan had approved the 
new history textbook. 
Non-cooperative diplomatic relations, however, did not persist in the face of 
their interdependence as reflected by the upcoming 2002 World Cup and interchanges 
in the private sector and in the face of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US. 
The two governments made efforts to restore normal diplomatic relations and prevent 
further deterioration of their bilateral relationship. In addition, efforts to improve their 
relations were accelerated in the wake the second North Korean nuclear crisis. As a 
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result, their relations turned relatively stable and cooperative. This thesis will further 
discuss the shift from friction to cooperation in the following section. 
 Government efforts to patch their relations, however, could not bring an end 
to the recurrent reemergence of thorny colonial issues nor the public’s spiraling 
absorption into the growing nationalistic sentiment in either country. Politics in the 
ROK became more progressive, while Japanese politics veered towards the right 
(Rozeman and Lee 2006: 783), and nationalism had become a means to domestic 
political success in both countries (Rozman and Lee 2006: 764).  
 In January 2005, the ROK Foreign Ministry disclosed declassified documents 
on the 1965 Korea-Japan normalization accord. These would enable individuals to 
initiate compensation lawsuits against the Japanese government for wartime abuses.76 
On the Japanese side, in the middle of the nuclear standoff in July 2003 Takami Eto, a 
senior Japanese ruling party lawmaker, announced that Japan’s 1910 annexation of the 
Korean peninsula was “based on the mutual agreement and was accepted 
internationally.’’77 Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara publicly proclaimed that his 
country never annexed the Korean Peninsula by force and that colonization was the 
choice of the Korean people.78 In May 2004, a Japanese right-wing group called 
Nihon Shidokai tried to land on Tokto in order to lay claim Japan’s territory.79 In 
addition, since his inauguration, Prime Minister Koizumi continued his annual visits to 
the Yasukuni Shrine. Certainly, these issues, as Shibuichi (2005: 1999) suggests, led to 
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the continuation of the conflicts of nationalist identity between Koreans and Japanese. 
Japan-ROK relations eventually deteriorated to their worst level in 2005. This 
happened in the midst of the North Korean nuclear standoff. The security imperative 
that had emerged in the face of the second North Korean nuclear crisis could not 
prevent Korean-Japanese relations from reaching their nadir. The nuclear standoff was 
not sufficient to prevent a deterioration of bilateral relations owing to conflicts of anti-
Japanese identity among Koreans and nationalist identity among Japanese. The impact 
of the nuclear issue on their relations gradually faded away with the lingering nuclear 
standoff for three reasons: First and foremost, their relations had consistently 
witnessed the emergence of thorny colonial issues. This led the two countries to suffer 
continuously from conflicts of nationalist identity.  
Second, South-North Korean relations and Japan-North Korean relations 
began to move in different directions. This caused a difference in the perception of the 
North Korean threat between South Koreans and Japanese, resulting in widening the 
level of anti-North Korean sentiment between them. An opinion poll by the Dong-A 
Newspaper indicated that 47.3 percent of the Japanese respondents felt threatened 
greatly by the North Korean nuclear development, whereas only 13.3 percent of the 
South Korean respondents felt similarly threatened.80
From the late 1990s, the ROK continuously pursued its engagement policy 
toward North Korea and, consequently, a new era promising rapprochement between 
two Koreas began to emerge. The improved bilateral relationship between North 
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Korea and the United States led by the Clinton administration following the June 2000 
inter-Korean summit had also contributed to this development.81 South Koreans’ fears 
of the North Korean threat were reduced by the inter-Korean summit and the growth 
of inter-Korean economic exchanges. This provided a less adversarial attitude, 
particularly among post-Korean War generations, toward the North.82 It also coincided 
with the ROK’s search for “a modern, 21st-century Korean identity beyond the anti-
communism identity of their parents” (Cha and Kang 2003: 171-172). An example of 
the erosion of South Korean anti-North Korean sentiment was the National Assembly 
members’ consideration in 2003 of abolishing the National Security Law, a symbol of 
South Korean anti-North Koreanism. In addition, faced with the long-standing 
diplomatic disputes between the North and the US and the second nuclear standoff, 
many Koreans, particularly younger generations, blamed the United States for 
provoking North Korea to pursue nuclear brinkmanship, instead of decrying the North 
Korean wrongdoings. Democracy, economic development, and improved inter-Korean 
relations gave rise to young generations who perceive the United States, not as a 
savior in the Korean War, but as an overbearing ally and a past supporter of military-
authoritarian regimes in Korea (Cha and Kang 2003: 171).  
                                            
81 Right after the inter-Korean summit, the Clinton administration announced that it would 
embark on removing some of economic sanctions against North Korea. Following this US 
action, the improvement of the bilateral US-North Korea relations took place. The North 
Korean delegation, led by the Vice-Marshal Jo Myong Rok, visited the United States in 
October 2000 and in return, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited North Korea. 
During the meeting between Albright the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, Kim agreed to 
controls over missile production and an end to missile sales, if compensation were made. See 
Scalapino (2006) for details. 
82 Much of the South Korean population began to distinguish the North Korean citizens from 
the communist ruling elites and identified them as brothers calling for pan-Korean 
brotherhood. 
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As a consequence, the US’s revelation of the North Korean HEU program did 
not shock and threaten South Koreans to the extent that the first nuclear issue and the 
Taepo-dong missile test-firing had. Indeed, one poll in South Korea indicated that 
sixty six percent of respondents supported their government’s humanitarian assistance 
to North Korea despite of the North’s nuclear program while thirty three percent said it 
should be halted immediately, seventy seven percent said that all problems related to 
North Korea should be settled through dialogue, and only twenty three percent said 
that the North’s nuclear program was grave concern.83
On the other hand, Japanese perceptions of the North Korean threat were not 
reduced, but instead intensified. Prior to the emergence of the second nuclear crisis, 
Japan-North Korean relations had been bogged down for years. During this period, 
Japan’s efforts to normalize relations with North Korea were unsuccessful. Then, the 
Taepo-Dong missile test-firing took place followed sinking the North Korean spy ship 
by the Japanese Coast Guard.84 More important, the issues of return visits of Japanese 
wives and the abduction of Japanese nationals re-emerged, resulting in growing anti-
North Korean sentiment in Japan. To deal with the North Korean issues and calm its 
angry public, the Japanese government demanded that North Korea settle the missile, 
nuclear, and abduction issues. North Korea made no constructive efforts to respond to 
the Japan’s actions.  
Despite the ongoing contentious Japanese and North Korean relationship, the 
two surprisingly held a summit talk in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002. Ostensibly, 
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the negotiations were successful in as much as they produced a series of agreed 
provisions for normalizing their relationship and produced North Korea’s pledge for a 
moratorium on missile test-firing. Conversely, it actually produced a serious backfire 
on Japan-North Korean relations.  
Koizumi’s visit to North Korea aimed at reducing the level of tension and 
paving the way to normalizing relations between the two countries.85 Pyongyang 
welcomed his visit since the country desperately needed economic assistance from 
Japan. At that time, North Korea was in serious economic crisis and under 
international sanctions led by the Bush administration. Kim Jong-Il and Koizumi 
agreed to “strive to normalization at the earliest possible date, settling once and for all 
the issues of the abducted Japanese, the nuclear program, and colonial period issues” 
(Wada 2003). It looked as though Japan and North Korea had agreed to open an era for 
peace and cooperation.  
During the summit, Kim Jong Il officially acknowledged and apologized for 
North Korea’s responsibility for kidnapping Japanese nationals, causing a serious 
political backlash in Japan. Immediately, anti-North Korean sentiment erupted. 
Japanese nationalist groups and politicians encouraged the Japanese public’s anti-
North Korean sentiment. What was worse was that the US’s revelation of the North 
Korean HEU program took place only two weeks after the summit. Japanese 
nationalist groups and politicians, as well as its public in general, resented the 
Koizumi government for making a hasty decision on normalizing relationship with 
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North Korea (Kim 2006). Much of the public wanted their government to take strong 
steps in regards to the nuclear issue and to link the abduction issue to the nuclear issue. 
In addition, they expressed distrust of the Kim Jong Il regime. Public attitudes were 
such that unless the abduction issue was resolved, its government should not offer any 
incentives to North Korea for resolving the nuclear issue (Fouse 2004).  
 Under these circumstances, in managing the nuclear crisis the Japanese 
government was compelled to pursue the hard-line foreign policy toward North Korea. 
The Koizumi government sought coordinated steps with what the hawkish Bush 
administration implemented against North Korea, owing to its difficulty in softening 
the rage of electorates against the Kim Jong Il regime (Kihl 2005). At a May 2003 US-
Japan summit meeting, Bush and Koizumi agreed not to tolerate North Korea’s 
nuclear program. Koizumi also announced that Japan would crack down more 
vigorously on North Korean illegal activities.86 Furthermore, Koizumi attempted to 
push the abduction issue to become a primary agenda in the Six-Party Talks.  
Third, the US-ROK alliance and the US-Japan alliance had been moving in 
different directions since the late 1990s (Kim and Glosserman 2004). This contributed 
to reducing the rationale for trilateral cooperation in the face of the North Korean 
issues.  
The US-Japan alliance began to be reinforced in the wake of a series of North 
Korean threats and the rise of China (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003). In this period 
and with the support of the US, Japan endeavored to achieve balanced international 
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roles as one of the world’s economic leaders, as well as one of the world’s military 
leaders, which resulted in the reinvigoration of their alliance. The strategic weight of 
Washington’s Asian alliances began to shift increasingly toward developing Japan’s 
security role in East Asia. Japan and the United States made the April Clinton-
Hashimoto joint declaration and signed the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 
1996. One year later, they eventually agreed and approved the Revised Guidelines for 
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in 1997.87 Moreover, Japan decided to participate in 
the US-led Missile Defense System, contributing to the system by providing 
technology and expenses (Kang and Kasada 2001: 56). In the 2000s, the Bush 
administration and the Koizumi government worked closely and displayed various 
signs of consolidated friendship between Japan and United States. For instance, in the 
wake of the terrorist attack on America on the September 11, 2001, the Japanese Diet 
passed in October 2001 Antiterrorism Special Law, which authorized the Self Defense 
Forces (SDF) to participate in logistic operations in the Bush administration’s 
antiterrorist operation. In July 2003, the Diet also passed the Iraq Special Measures 
Laws, which directed the SDF to provide logistical support to the troops of the US and 
its allies. The strengthened bilateral US-Japan relationship was seen while they were 
working on the North Korean issues as well. Faced with the nuclear crisis, the 
Koizumi government performed coordinated steps with what the aggressive Bush 
administration implemented against North Korea. Japan also participated in the PSI 
                                            
87 It looked as though Japan and the US embarked on enhancing the US-Japan alliance 
system through the new Guideline. Interestingly, Japan at that time also had some uncertainty 
about the security relationship with the US. See Katzenstein and Ojawara (2001) for more 
details. 
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(Proliferation Security Initiative) program to interdict North Korean WMD exports. 
Therefore, under the leadership of Bush and Koizumi, the Japan-US alliance was 
improved greatly and their friendship became more solidified than ever before. 
On the other hand, the US-ROK alliance showed a downward tendency to 
some degree. The shift in the alliance is substantially related to the inter-Korean 
relations and the growth of South Korean nationalism. The newly inaugurated Bush 
administration in the United States did not welcome the ROK’s engagement policy 
toward North Korea. In addition, it publicly claimed that the US would thoroughly 
review the Clinton administration’s North Korean engagement policy (Kihl 2005). 
President Goerge W. Bush frequently expressed a lack of trust toward the Kim Jong Il 
regime.88 The US seemed to believe that the ROK’s engagement policy was not a 
successful means to defuse the nuclear program (Scalapino 2006: 150). The Bush 
government thus pursued hard-line oriented policy measures toward North Korea. The 
US’s North Korean policy change resulted not merely in diplomatic tit-for-tat disputes 
between the US and the North, but also in the escalation of fears in the Korean 
peninsula.  
Contrary to the Bush administration’s clear reservation of the Sunshine policy, 
the Roh Moo-Hyun government continued to pursue the North Korean engagement 
policy, inherited from the previous administration, as South Korean national power 
and international status increased and as nationalism grew.89 During the ongoing 
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North Korea as a part of an “axis of evil.” 
89 President Roh’s vision for the South-North relations was rooted in the background of the 
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nuclear standoff, the Roh administration continuously pursued economic cooperation 
and provided the North with humanitarian aids for the severe shortage of food and 
devastated agricultural and economic conditions.  
The Roh administration opposed the US’s hawkish policy options in 
managing the North Korean nuclear crisis, such as international sanctions and 
consideration of a military strike. The Roh administration was also reluctant to 
participate in the US’s China policies that had the potential to provoke China. For 
instance, since China was greatly concerned about enhancing US-led missile defense 
program in the Northeast Asia (Fridegberg 2005), the ROK, which saw a need for 
cooperating with Beijing due to the Chinese leverage with North Korea as well as its 
economic links with China, was hesitant to join the missile program (Suh 2004). More 
importantly, the ROK government demanded that the United States hand over war-
time Operational Control (OPCON). Consequently, during this period the US-ROK 
alliance began to erode. 
As discussed, the security imperative that South Korea and Japan faced 
immediately after the rise of nuclear crisis was not as prominent as what they had 
                                                                                                                             
presidential election in 2002. He won on a groundswell of anti-American sentiment. In 2002, 
in the face of the deaths of the two middle school girls who were struck by a US military car, 
the improved inter-Korean relations and the rise of nationalism gave rise to anti-Americanism. 
This anti-Americanism swept the country and massive protests against the US took place in 
the ROK. It was not difficult for the ROK to observe that its people, including politicians, 
called for a change in US-South Korean relations. A presidential candidate from the ruling 
progressive party, Roh Moo-Hyun, was an advocate for a revision in the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) between the ROK and the US and also protested the US’s lukewarm 
reaction the incident. He won the election and soon after his inauguration, the Roh 
administration promised to continue the South-North economic cooperation despite the 
ongoing the nuclear standoff. It continued to provide the North with humanitarian aid because 
of a severe shortage of food and devastating agricultural and economic conditions. 
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faced during either the first nuclear crisis or the missile test-fire. In addition, as the 
nuclear standoff took place, the issue did not gain enough salience to avert their 
bilateral relations from being determined by issues of colonial history. As a result, the 
impact of the nuclear issue on ROK-Japanese relations faded in the lingering nuclear 
standoff. The binding role of the nuclear crisis eventually lost its effect between the 
two states giving way to the more prominent colonial issues.  
In 2005, the conflict of Korea’s anti-Japanese identity and Japan’s nationalist 
identity reached its climax. As illustrated, prior to the Tokto issue, Japan’s politicians 
and right-wings had continuously brought out and committed to nationalist activities 
in order to innervate the growing nationalism and the ROK’s politicians and civil 
groups had also performed nationalist activities and had responded to or protested 
against the Japanese activities related to colonial history. Nationalism had 
continuously grown both in Japan and South Korea and consequently nationalist 
identities had been simulated both by their own politicians and the other’s politicians. 
 The Tokto issue became a tipping point for Korean anger directed at Japan 
(Rozman and Lee 2006: 476). In the eyes of Koreans, Japan’s provocative measures 
were seen as attempts to justify its invasion and deny Korea’s independence—for 
example as already stated, Japan claimed February 22 “Takeshima Day,” a day when 
Japanese government had incorporated Tokto into Japan’s territory exactly 100 years 
ago. This issue was a direct threat to Korea’s national identity and inspired 
“colonial/imperial recall among ordinary Koreans” (Kim 2006: 165), triggering 
protests across the country. Yet, no Japanese response came to the request of the ROK. 
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This led President Roh to employ a strong stance. When faced with the rise of anti-
Japanese sentiment and a push for the resolution of colonial issues, Roh promised that 
the government would step up efforts to resolve the issue of individual victims` claims 
to seek indemnity from Japan.  
For the Japanese society, it was difficult to understand the ROK government’s 
reasons to intervene in its domestic political sphere and why South Koreans shared 
such staunch anti-Japanese sentiment (Lee 2006: 16). Many Japanese did not 
understand why Koreans were seriously attached to colonial issues, while many barely 
knew of the brutality during Japanese colonial occupation and still considered Koreans 
as “rough, uncouth and backward people.”90 In the eye of Japanese, the ROK’s strong 
responses and protests were seen only as the ROK’s meddling in the internal affairs of 
Japan. Japanese right-wing politicians and groups used these tough responses to 
strengthen Japanese nationalism, producing anti-Korean sentiment. In this context, 
without regard of the ROK’s strong reactions, Japan’s Shimane Prefecture Council 
eventually passed the bill on March 16 and the Ministry of Education planned to 
approve controversial history textbooks. These issues further increased Koreans’ anti-
Japanese sentiment placing the ROK government under pressure to respond. As a 
result, president Roh declared “a diplomatic war against Japan,” all points previously 
addressed. 
During this period, the anger of the ROK was so serious that the ROK viewed 
Japan’s previous remark on the “regret” of the painful colonial past as “hypocrisy.”91 
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Furthermore, Koreans, including the President, were so enraged that they made 
reference to North Korea’s kidnapping of Japanese nationals in a similar way to 
Japan’s atrocities during the colonial period, charging that Japan should understand the 
anger of Koreans because their pain during the colonial period was much more 
significant than that of the Japanese over the kidnapping issue (Takahashi 2005). To 
confront Japan’s unrepentant and provocative activities, as already discussed, South 
Korea strongly protested against Japan.  
Therefore, as constructivism posits, as a consequence of the interaction 
between the growing nationalism in Japan and its by-products and the growing 
nationalism in South Korea and its by-products, the national identity conflicts 
persistently took place and played a primary role in producing the conflictive 
relationship in this period. These identity conflicts in the rises of the past colonial 
issues seemed to trump almost every issue of their relations. Evidently, their relations 
was severely conflictive enough, for instance, to cancel summit talks twice although 
the year of 2005 was supposed to be a year of cooperation and reconciliation for the 
government agreed to call it “Korea-Japan Friendship Year” to celebrate the 40th 
anniversary of normalization of diplomatic ties.  
Despite this contentious relationship in the conflicts of nationalist identity, 
Japan and Korea kept exchanges in some spheres and levels throughout this period. 
Although there was no dramatic shift in the relationship similar to the Partnership for 
the 21st century, the two states made efforts to restore diplomatic relations and prevent 
the deterioration of the relationship. What, then, made the two countries continue the 
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exchanges and improve the conflictive relationship?  
 
A Mix of Liberalism and Constructivism and A Combination of Realism and 
Constructivism 
Hanging Together: A mix of constructivism and liberalism can explain their 
cooperation during this period. Forfeiting economic relationships must be too costly 
for interdependent economies despite political friction, as liberals suggest. 
Governments’ policies must be adjusted to one another, even in cases in which 
conflicts between states become severe. As liberal reasons advocate, it was difficult 
for Japan and the ROK to continuously engage in tit-for-tat diplomatic row. 
As political tension became severe in the face of the history book dispute in 
2001, there emerged a serious concern that Japan and the ROK became so preoccupied 
with colonial issues that they could sabotage their social and economic ties. In the 
continuation of their diplomatic friction, the behavior of the ROK and Japan became 
constrained by the norm that political conflicts derived from colonial issues should be 
managed separately from other aspects of the relations. Their collective identity of 
partnership thus was resurrected. This identity began to have a bigger impact on 
Korean and Japanese interest formation than other nationalistic identities. They 
perceived that economic cooperation should not fall prey to political conflicts, derived 
from the historical and territorial issues, due to their interdependence (e.g., trade 
interdependence, incoming 2002 World Cup, interchanges in the private sector). As a 
result, governmental efforts to restore normal diplomatic relations and prevent a 
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further deterioration of their bilateral relationship emerged—adjust their policies to 
each other.   
Accounting for cooperation in the wake of the nuclear crisis, we can use a 
combination of the realists’ balancing logic and the constructivists’ collective anti-
communist identity. This is this same theoretical perspective which was applied to 
their relationship in the missile crisis in 1998.  
As analyzed, owing to the changes in their domestic and international security 
environments, the degree of the security imperative that Japan and the ROK faced 
immediately after the rise of nuclear crisis was lower than that of the imperatives in 
the previous issues (Kim and Glosserman 2004: 8-9). Moreover, the expansion of 
Japanese military commitment to the US-led anti-terrorism issues was worrisome for 
the ROK (Kim 2006: 203).  
However, there was no doubt that the North Korean nuclear issue posed an 
immediate threat to Japan and South Korea. After the emergence of the threat, this 
bold North Korean action became the most salient issue between them. Their security 
partnership-identity became paramount not only because they were jointly threatened 
by North Korea, but also because they had been jointly squeezed between the US-
North Korean diplomatic tit-for-tat disputes. In addition, because the stalled nuclear 
negotiations were likely to boost the possibility of a military conflict, the ROK and 
Japan shared rising fears of impotence and the need for collaborative efforts. This 
resulted in further enhancing their threat and intensifying their collective identity. With 
this shared identity, the cooperative behavior of the two states, as realism envisions, 
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began to be determined by the threat.  
These two security partners began to conduct policy consultations with each 
other. Japan and the ROK were determined to make a united front against North Korea 
and launch a non-military-oriented initiative. They also shared significant security 
concerns with reference to the US-North Korean relations and agreed that the issue 
should be resolved through a peaceful diplomatic approach.92 The following example 
reflected their joint effort: since Japan and the ROK, as US allies, came under pressure 
to follow the US-led North Korean initiatives, they agreed that the KEDO should, as 
the US called for, suspend fuel oil deliveries to North Korea to condemn its pursuit of 
a nuclear weapons program. In return, they led the US to declare that “the US has no 
intension of invading North Korea.”93
As the nuclear crisis became more of a standoff, the security cooperation 
imperative that Japan and the ROK faced was further increased. The two security 
partners began with institutionalizing policy consultation with each other. Eventually, 
Roh and Koizumi frequently discussed how to settle the North Korean nuclear issue 
peacefully and discussed other ways to boost ties between South Korea and Japan, 
resulting in the establishment of shuttle diplomacy. 
Although the degree of the impact of the North Korean threat decreased, the 
nuclear issue still threatened both Japan and the ROK. In the security cooperation 
imperative that they faced after the nuclear crisis, their security partnership was 
recalled and strengthened. They were bound to prevent a military outbreak on the 
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Korean peninsula. The two security partners’ efforts to keep close coordination and 
cooperation continued to increase during this period. 
To explain why the government kept diplomatic exchanges at least at a 
minimum level in 2005, when political tension was so conflictive that a diplomatic 
war was declared and summit talks were cancelled twice in 2005, we must use a 
combination of constructivism and liberalism.  
As their relations became seriously conflictive in the recurrent rises of 
colonial history issues, there emerged a growing concern that the two countries 
became so preoccupied with these issues that they could sabotage their social and 
economic issues interconnecting them. South Korea and Japan could not ignore other 
salient issues, although the national identity conflicts prevented the Asian countries 
not only from consolidating a constructive and prosperous relationship through 
cooperation and consultations, but also from moving toward an era free from the 
shadows of the colonial history. The two states thus collectively perceived that the 
negative colonial legacies should be resolved. More important, they shared the norm 
that political conflicts derived from the historical and territorial issues should be 
managed separately from other aspects of their relations. 
In this vein, it seems natural that national identity conflicts should not always 
take precedence over cooperation, stemming from the effect of economic 
interdependence and the boosted shared identities (e.g., the ROK and Japan have been 
identified as partners for creating peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia). In fact, 
Japan was the second largest trading partner to the ROK and the ROK served as the 
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second largest trading partner to Japan in the region. After the financial crisis, the 
economic ties between them gradually increased. For example, by 2004, total trade 
stood at $67.8 billion, an increase of 133 percent from 1998 (Kim 2006). Cultural 
exchanges continued to blossom at the civil level, as well. Japan recently witnessed a 
boom of Korean pop culture with the success of Korean soap operas on Japanese 
television. Similarly, Japanese pop culture became increasingly popular in the ROK. 
Overall 10,000 Koreans visited Japan and 20,000 Japanese visited South Korea 
daily.94 Had the ROK and Japan ignored these factors, their relationship would not 
have flourished as it has.  
For these reasons, the ROK and Japan made efforts to ameliorate the cooled 
relationship. They tried to bolster non-political exchanges separate from their 
continued diplomatic stand-off. For instance, since the designation of 2005 as “Korea-
Japan Friendship Year,” the tourism ministers of South Korea and Japan agreed to 
continue working closely to strengthen cultural, economic, and tourism ties despite 
recent political disputes.95 The Japanese government also announced that it planned to 
grant a permanent visa waiver to South Korean tourists.  
 In addition to the governmental efforts, there were civilian efforts to improve 
the deteriorated relationship. In Japan, a concern over the movement toward the right 
and the resurgence of nationalism was gradually growing and those who shared the 
concern began to worry about their relationship with the ROK. Although they were 
highly outnumbered by the political right, they offered various measures of 
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cooperation including the Korea-Japan Forum consisting of political leaders, scholars, 
businessmen, and public intellectuals. The Forum focused on discussing various issues 
for cooperative relations and running a joint research group to make new history books 
not only for Japanese students, but also for Korean students.   
Therefore, the two countries cooperated with each other, owing to economic 
interdependence and the long-standing nuclear standoff which increased the possibility 
of either military conflict or the risk of a sudden collapse of the North. Such 
cooperative relations reflected a combination of liberal interdependence and 
constructivist insights and that of realist balancing and constructivist insights. 
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Chapter 4. CONCLUSION 
 
Japan-ROK relations in the post-Cold War era have combined cooperation and 
conflict in unexpected ways. There have been no studies which account sufficiently 
for the long-term variation of their relations. Such volatile relations are anomalous to 
each parsimonious IR paradigm, which tends to account for relations among states 
only within their own research context and ignore the advantages of other 
perspectives’ explanations. As scholars of the analytical eclecticism suggest (e.g., 
Katzenstein and Okawara 2001; Katzenstein and Sil 2004), each parsimonious IR 
perspective cannot account for Japan-ROK relations. Their anomalous relations can be 
explained if we selectively use and combine different IR perspectives, realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism, as each IR paradigm produces valuable insights for 
certain issues. According to this theoretical reasoning, this thesis sought to present that 
Japan-ROK relations in the post-Cold War era are explained adequately by a pluralist 
approach, which combines selectively different IR perspectives with grasping field 
observations and area specialists’ descriptive/narrative views for identifying important 
factors that are critical to recognizing and accounting for a problem but are barely 
identifiable to each IR paradigm.  
However, by no means the pluralist theoretical explanations presented in this 
thesis are the only account for volatile Japan-ROK relations. Instead, this research 
seeks to help us understand the complex nature of the conflictive and cooperative 
Japan-ROK relations and sufficiently demonstrate we can explain their volatile 
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relations if we selectively draw insights on three IR paradigms. As already discussed, 
making sense of empirical anomalies is more valuable than focusing exclusively on 
one parsimonious IR perspective and excluding others. Empirical anomalies including 
Japan-ROK relations, which often appear to be fundamentally critical affairs, should 
be adequately explained by any feasible method. In this regard, this study has 
significant interest in showing that one alternative to account for anomalous affairs is 
to combine insights from different IR perspectives, instead of looking only at certain 
preselected variables and particular aspects of a problem, and pursuing a single IR 
research context, and consequently ignoring the advantages of other perspectives’ 
explanations.   
Finally, this study identifies how to improve Japan-ROK relations by 
analyzing what has caused the relations to be contentious and conflictive. The ROK 
and Japan have not lost the psychological barriers stemming from Japan’s occupation 
and thus shaped fixed identities toward each other. For Koreans, collective memories 
have been a basis for hatred toward the Japanese and this anti-Japanese sentiment has 
become a major part of Korean national identity and nationalism. For Japanese, little 
understanding of their ancestors’ brutal rule on the Korean peninsula and their superior 
sentiment toward their colonized subjects have been a basis for misunderstanding 
Koreans’ stern responses to the territorial and colonial issues. Simply speaking, they 
have not understood each other regarding these issues. In the period of growing 
nationalism with this “do-not-understand-phenomenon” in both countries, both 
Japanese and Korean politicians have manipulated or roused these thorny issues to 
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gain political support. This has intensified historical antagonism and prevented the two 
countries from trusting and cooperating with each other. Therefore, future-oriented 
relations have not taken place. It is vital for Japan and the ROK to overcome conflicts 
of nationalist identity by settling historical and territorial issues.  
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